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Abstract 
 
The debate around the perpetual nature of endowment funds from the perspective of 
current versus future obligations is a major problem that I would like to address in two ways: (i) 
a macro-level treatment of the simultaneous asset allocation and spending rate with subsistence 
levels (analogous to the habit formation concept); and (ii) a micro-level analysis of one part of 
the endowment portfolio with a particular emphasis on the currency hedging decision. The 
purpose of the third chapter is to illustrate the significance of joint determination of appropriate 
asset allocation and spending rate decisions, and to describe the behavior of the endowment fund 
portfolio under certain modeling assumptions, including a sensitivity analysis that evaluates, in 
particular, the relationship between the spending rate and stock allocation over an extended 
period of time by changing the values of certain parameters in the model. The fourth chapter 
tackles the issue of international diversification from the point of view of active currency 
hedging. The ability to control risk with the possibility of return enhancement is the main reason 
why institutional investors such as university endowments should worry about the international 
diversification of investment portfolios.  
I have concentrated on an area, which has been overlooked by endowment funds for a 
long time. That is, the introduction of currency hedging in the context of an international 
portfolio and the provision of some behavioral considerations: first, implicitly, in the framework 
of the traditional expected utility maximization and then, explicitly, in the disappointment-averse 
functional context. In both chapters, the discussion is heavily based on the specification of the 
utility function; i.e., habit formation through the use of a subsistence level in the case of asset 
allocation and spending rate determination, and behavioral/agency-related formulation of various 





Endowments are typically set up as permanent funds for the support of 
institutions such as private high schools, universities and museums. Through 
regular fund raising programs and occasional fund drives, these institutions have 
constant access to financial support from alumni and other interested parties. 
Alternatively, foundations are created by a monetary gift from an individual, 
family, or corporation with minimal additional contributions after the initial grant. 
Unlike foundations, there are no tax penalties for a failure to make an annual 
distributions to beneficiaries for endowments, but structural constraints related to 
budgetary planning make it difficult for endowment managers to reduce payouts. 
Endowments should attempt to educate their beneficiaries about the long-term 
benefits of controlled spending by introducing prudent levels of spending that 
would preserve their ability to support the sponsoring institution in both good and 
bad times. Institutions that seek a proper balance between the needs of current and 
future recipients may be inclined to focus on the preservation of the corpus. This 
balance could only be accomplished by stringent limitations on current spending. 
James Tobin1 requires that an endowment “preserve equity among generations by 
supporting the set of activities that it is now supporting.” 
Since the passage of the Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act 
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1972 
                                                         
1 Please refer to “What is permanent endowment income?” American Economic Review 
64 (May):427-432. 
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and the adoption by almost all the states to the present time, the concept of 
“prudence” has been introduced in the management of endowment funds in the 
United States. This includes the balancing and management of short-term and 
long-term needs, present and anticipated financial requirements, price level 
trends, and general economic conditions. Educational institutions accumulate 
endowments to enhance the autonomy of university operations by not relying on 
government grants, student tuitions and gifts made by the alumni. Particularly, in 
the case of universities better-endowed institutions could utilize the incremental 
income stream to gain a competitive edge over the peer group that is dependent on 
the very similar revenue sources. Moreover, certain long-term commitments of 
institutions of higher learning such as awarding tenure to a faculty member fit 
nicely with the permanent nature of endowment funds. It is very important to 
understand the purposes of raising funds from alumni and corporations for the 
better structuring of an investment program. The perpetual nature of the 
endowment provides some kind of a leverage in terms of maintaining 
independence from external pressures. A viable route for university trustees to 
create an independent course of action is the support of the operating budget by 
endowment funds. In the case of public universities, the government grants for the 
support of specific research projects necessitate the adherence to specifics 
regulations and guidelines set forth by the state authorities. The Board of Regents 
is such an entity, which establishes the guidelines for the management of 
endowment funds that are created by private donations matched by the state. The 
board supports the endowed chair and professorships program in universities and 
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colleges of Louisiana. Other endowed funds do not fall into the umbrella of such a 
program and do provide better financial independence to institutions in terms of 
managing the portfolio of assets as well as the policies set forth for the 
distribution of funds on an annual basis. 
The debate around the perpetual nature of endowment funds from the 
perspective of current versus future obligations is a major problem that I would 
like to address in two ways: (i) a macro-level treatment of the simultaneous asset 
allocation and spending rate with subsistence levels (analogous to the habit 
formation concept); and (ii) a micro-level analysis of one part of the endowment 
portfolio with a particular emphasis on the currency hedging decision. The 
purpose of the third chapter is to illustrate the significance of joint determination 
of appropriate asset allocation and spending rate decisions, and to describe the 
behavior of the endowment fund portfolio under certain modeling assumptions, 
including a sensitivity analysis that evaluates, in particular, the relationship 
between the spending rate and stock allocation over an extended period of time by 
changing the values of certain parameters in the model. The fourth chapter tackles 
the issue of international diversification from the point of view of active currency 
hedging. The ability to control risk with the possibility of return enhancement is 
the main reason why institutional investors such as university endowments should 
worry about the international diversification of investment portfolios. The 
pressure of enhancing the market value of an endowment fund, particularly, at 
times when the risk premia of stock investments are adjusted downward, along 
with the significance of outperforming peer institutions in terms of portfolio 
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performance leads to the consideration of non-traditional approaches to total 
portfolio management such as the use of private equity, venture capital and hedge 
funds. Despite the fact that these alternative ways of managing endowment funds 
require a high level of governance, indicating significant oversight by the board 
and serious commitment by the endowment management team, they could be very 
beneficial in providing a cutting-edge solution for the problem at hand and 
enabling the institution to create a comfortable cushion that is necessary for the 
survival of the fund during bad times. My concentration will be on an area that 
has been overlooked by endowment funds for a long time, that is, the introduction 
of currency hedging in the context of an international portfolio and the provision 
of some behavioral considerations: first, implicitly, in the framework of the 
traditional expected utility maximization and then, explicitly, in the 
disappointment-averse functional context. In both chapters, the discussion is 
heavily based on the specification of the utility function; i.e., habit formation 
through the use of a subsistence level in the case of asset allocation and spending 
rate determination, and behavioral/agency-related formulation of various aversion 
parameters in the international portfolio management chapter. The use of currency 
overlay managers to actively hedge currency exposures of the portfolio 
necessitates the separation of the risk aversion parameter into two: one for the 
asset volatility and another for the currency component will be reviewed in 
particular. The rationale of using different parameters of risk aversion is when the 
international portfolio has two different incentive structure for managers; one for 
the ‘so-called’ asset manager(s) and another for the currency overlay manager(s). 
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The compensation of overlay managers is typically based on a fixed annual 
management fee plus an incentive scheme which provides performance-based 
fees to the overlay manager. Since the asymmetric nature of incentive schemes of 
asset and currency managers dictate how one optimizes the overall  endowment 
fund portfolio, the unusual behavior of an endowment fund should not be called 
irrational, only because the optimal currency hedging level deviates from the one 
derived under rational expectations. It only justifies the use of different hedging 
strategies by various institutional investors. I describe in detail how the level of 
hedging should be revised downwards because of behavioral factors. My 
conclusions are in the context of what people would predict to see in the market, 
if certain investors behave in an irrational way.  
Global portfolio management, in its broadest sense, involves the 
simultaneous evaluation of investment decisions regarding individual security 
selection such as stocks and bonds, industry weightings, country allocations as 
well as currency exposure. While exposure resulting from investments in 
international assets could have a significant impact on realized risk-adjusted 
returns, it is often overlooked at the total portfolio level. It is common among 
institutional investors to ignore the issue of hedging in the allocation of funds to 
various asset classes including international securities, and then involve in the 
structuring of the strategic hedging policy. Investment managers of many 
university endowment funds believe that any loss from failing to consider hedging 
at the initial stage is of second order. Hence, a lower level decision is made on 
how to hedge the international assets against currency risk, if at all. 
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It has been argued that the covariance between asset class and currency 
exposure should be analyzed in the context of portfolio construction to maximize 
the efficiency of the portfolio allocation decision. The full-blown optimization of 
currency and asset allocation decisions has been demonstrated empirically and 
theoretically to be more efficient for it exploits active risk diversification. For 
institutions that have already decided on the allocation of funds among various 
asset classes, the only viable option is to consider hedging as a follow-up 
decision, which is called the two-step or sequential approach to currency hedging. 
The practicality of the so-called one-step (or full-blown) approach is questionable 
except for the strategic determination of the optimal hedge ratio, which serves 
either the passive position or the benchmark level in case of a currency overlay 
program. The use of independent international equity and bond managers in 
institutional portfolios poses a challenge when it comes to integrating the country 
asset allocation decisions with active management of currency exposure. 
Currency overlay managers provide an opportunity to add an independent source 
of value in global investment portfolios via tactical currency management. The 
currency overlay product, which was designed and implemented for external 
portfolios toward the end of 1980’s, is the active and independent management of 
the foreign exchange exposures associated with international stock and bond 
investments. Many large investment management firms have been actively 
managing currency exposure to provide enhanced returns over the specified 
benchmark in global tactical asset allocation products. On the other hand, the 
principal source of value-added from a currency overlay strategy has been in the 
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risk control in international portfolios during the early periods of product 
implementation. The risk-oriented approach to currency overlay attempts to re-
distribute currency returns to yield an option-like payoff with the purpose of 
eliminating the risk of ruin. To this end, it seeks downside protection from 
adverse currency moves, and at the same time, participate when the currency 
moves in its favor. Over the years, other styles have emerged in the overlay 
business with the intent of improving the value-added potential of international 
assets such as the so-called fundamental and technical styles.  
University endowments have been increasing the allocation to 
international assets during the last two decades. The growing globalization of 
institutional portfolios over this period has heightened the issue of how to cope 
with the consequential exposure to currency volatility. The traditional approach to 
dealing with the added risk arising from foreign exchange exposure has included, 
but has not been limited to, one of the following three forms: (a) no hedging, (b) 
passive hedging, (c) active hedging. Certain institutional investors with risk 
preferences that do not tolerate the volatility arising from unhedged currency 
positions employ either passive or active hedging policies in the management of 
international assets. In the case of passive hedging that could take the form of full 
or partial hedging the investment committee fixes a hedge ratio and then delegates 
the implementation to either in-house managers or external specialists. The active 
approach, on the other hand, could be seen as periodic deviation from the chosen 
benchmark (neutral) position whenever the currency market expectation offers an 
attractive opportunity. There are three well-known management styles as far as 
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active currency hedging is concerned: (a) Risk-controlling, providing option-like 
payoffs, also known as “dynamic hedging”; (b) Fundamental, based on predicting 
macroeconomic elements in international markets; and (c) Technical, based on 
model-driven strategies using technical analysis. 
Contrary to the hedging strategy that separates the portfolio choice and the 
risk from the hedging decision, I will explicitly consider currency hedging in the 
context of international portfolio management. In order to deal effectively with 
currency exposure in a portfolio, one needs to evaluate the impact of foreign 
exchange movements on both risk and return of the total portfolio as well as 
evaluate alternatives within the decision-making process and provide guidelines 
as to how to structure a hedging program. To this end, institutional investors 
could engage in the active management of hedge ratios for individual currency 
pairs by hiring currency overlay managers with distinct styles. 
Additionally, the active management of currency exposure should be 
handled by third party specialized managers, who do not have any potential 
conflicts of interest with the management of the underlying assets. This approach 
helps changes be made in currency exposure without disrupting the active 
management of individual securities and country allocations. These changes in 
broad exposure can be structured in a systematic way through a disciplined 
process of global asset allocation and active currency management, whereby 
hedging is implemented using currency forwards or options by the overlay 
manager. The asset and currency managers can fully concentrate on their 
strengths by separating the asset allocation decision from the currency exposure 
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decision. Moreover, it is much easier to implement and monitor the attributes of 
each component in global portfolios. The essence of a thorough long-term 
investment policy rests on the successful design and implementation of strategic 
asset allocation, which is done in the asset-only space in case of university 
endowments (asset-only optimization) and in the asset-liability space in case of 
pension plans (surplus optimization). Grinold and Meese (2000b) postulate that 
the usual practice of subordinating currency decisions to a lower level leads to 
large and predictable biases in the strategic asset allocation both in the asset-only 
and asset-liability case. The challenge facing the use of currency overlay 
managers as a non-traditional investment vehicle is due to the bureaucratic nature 
of endowment fund management. The consensus-building behavior between 
investment committees and internal investment management teams influences the 
design of the investment process by thwarting non-traditional activities such as 
private equity, hedge funds and currency overlay, and imposing shorter-than-
optimal time horizons from a performance measurement perspective. The words 
of Keynes (1936) come to mind: “Worldly wisdom teaches that it is better for 





2. 1.  Modeling Issues in the Management of University Endowment Funds 
Merton (1993) is the first to postulate that university endowment funds 
should be managed  according to the principles of diversification and hedging by 
utilizing a reduced-form model of a university as a utility-maximizing agent. 
Specifically, he defines the university’s objective as the maximization of a von 
Neumann-Morgenstern, time-separable, and concave utility function of the level 
of a set of activities 
1
( ) ( ), , ( )
m




E U Q t t
∞
=
     
∑ . The 
price (or net cost) of activity j is ( )jS t . No distinction is made between the 
marginal and average cost of an activity, leading to a perfectly elastic supply of 
activities. The vector of activity prices [ ]1( ) ( ), , ( )mS t S t S t= K  is an exogenous 
autoregressive process which Merton models as a continuous-time diffusion 
process. The endowment capital at the beginning of period t is K(t). The 
nonendowment income at t is Y(t), an exogenous stochastic process. Merton 
models [S(t), Y(t)] as a diffusion process, and further assumes that the 
nonendowment income is spanned by the returns of financial assets. Then, the 
nonendowment income stream [ ]( ), ( 1),Y t Y t + K may be capitalized with value 
^
( )Y t . The university’s wealth is defined as 
^
( ) ( ) tW t K t Y= + , the sum of 
endowment capital and capitalized present and future nonendowment income. 
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Merton models the joint process of financial asset prices, activity prices, and 
nonendowment income as a diffusion process. The wealth dynamics is 
( 1) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 1)W t W t Q t S t w t R t ′ ′+ = − +  . 
 The control variables are the activity levels ( )Q t and the portfolio weights 
( )w t . The university maximizes the expected utility by the sequential choice of 
activity levels and portfolio weights subject to the sequence of budget constraints 
and the constraint of nonnegative wealth. Basically, Merton models the 
university’s problem as the standard intertemporal consumption and investment 
problem, which has been studied extensively in the finance literature. 
 His primary focus is on the portfolio allocation, whereby the optimal 
portfolio consists of a mean-variance efficient portfolio of the endowment plus 
the capitalized nonendowment income, modified by an overlay of hedging 
portfolios designed to hedge against unanticipated shifts in the state variables. In 
the special case where the indirect utility of consumption is the sum of the 
logarithm of consumption and a function of the state variables, a myopic policy is 
optimal. In this case, the university invests the endowment plus the capitalized 
nonendowment income in a mean-variance efficient portfolio, without an overlay 
of hedging portfolios. 
 Merton believes that the nature and size of a university’s nonendowment 
assets significantly influence optimal policy for spending endowment. He 
postulates that for a given overall expenditure rate as a fraction of the university’s 
total net worth, the optimal spending rate out of endowment will vary, depending 
on the fraction of net worth represented by nonendowment assets, the expected 
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growth rate of cash flows generated by those assets and capitalization rates. 
Hence, neglecting those other assets will generally bias the optimal expenditure 
policy for the endowment. His analysis suggests that trustees and others who 
judge the prudence and performance of policies by comparisons across 
institutions should take account of differences in both the mix of activities of 
institutions and the capitalized values of their nonendowment sources of cash 
flows. In addition, he theorizes that universities, in addition to investing in assets 
to achieve an efficient risk-return trade-off in wealth, should optimally use their 
endowment to hedge against unanticipated and unfavorable changes in the costs 
of the various activities that enter into their direct utility functions. Even though it 
is very appealing to believe in the existence of the university-wide utility function 
by assuming equal marginal rates of substitution among many agents of the 
university, the bottom line is a university does not have a clearly defined group of 
residual claimants. The public university could be thought of a series of explicit 
and implicit contracts among various economic agents that include a highly 
fragment faculty, a heterogeneous student body with overlapping generations 
features, the alumni, the trustees, the officers, and the state legislature. 
 I would a priori argue that the expected utility of an endowment should be 
positively related to the cushion over inflation-adjusted corpus in each period. In 
the asset-liability context, this cushion is called a surplus, if positive. This would 
enable us provide adequate spending policies for future beneficiaries of the 
endowment by explicitly keeping the purchasing power of the fund intact. Merton 
describes the liabilities of universities as state variables, and hence, ends up with a 
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hedge portfolio for the various university costs that is preference-dependent. In 
this alternative setting that includes the natural stochastic benchmark return, the 
hedge portfolio would depend not only on the liability structure; i.e., spending 
requirements,  but also how much cushion there is at any point in time. 
Dybvig (1995) motivates his model, which is close to modern models of 
habit formation such as those of Constantinides (1990), Detemple and Zapatero 
(1991), Shrikhande (1992) or Sunderesan (1989), to provide an alternative to the 
analysis of Grossman and Zhou (1993). Grossman and Zhou model ratcheting of 
risky investments by assuming a drawdown constraint that precludes wealth from 
falling below some proportion of the previous maximum without intermediate 
consumption withdrawal. One interpretation of Dybvig’s model is as a formal 
justification of the ratcheting behavior of consumption posited by Duesenberry 
(1949), who proposed  a consumption function which accounts for some 
adjustments for habits  or standards of living. Conventionally, if income falls, 
then consumption should fall proportionally with the marginal propensity to 
consume. Duesenberry rejected this conventional theory and postulated that once 
consumption habits are acquired, it is hard to get rid of them. Thus, income 
shocks should have slightly different effects on consumption. Certain 
consumption habits are formed at high income levels which are not completely 
abandoned when income falls. Basically, he says that consumption habits are 
acquired when income was at its highest influence present consumption decisions. 
The main difference between Dybvig’s model and other models of habit 
formation is in the rapidity of the habit formation and the severity of the agent’s 
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preferences for maintaining a new standard of living. In Dybvig’s case, the 
marginal utility of consumption at a point in time is discontinuous when 
consumption equals the previous maximum, and in fact, the marginal utility is 
infinite for any decrease in consumption but finite for any increase. 
2. 2.  Continuous-time Finance and Martingale Methodology 
Harrison and Kreps (1979) and Pliska (1986) build the famous Harrison-
Kreps-Pliska martingale methodology that relies on the duality principle due to 
Cox and Huang (1989) and Karatzas et al. (1987). Advantages of this approach as 
it is applied to the continuous-time consumption-investment problem could be 
summarized as follows: 
(i) It is easy to establish the existence of a solution to an intertemporal 
optimization problem. 
(ii) It is capable of handling optimization problems with constraints on 
state and choice variables such as consumption portfolio 
constraints and non-negativity constraints on consumption. 
(iii) The constructive idea behind the duality approach is to linearize 
the optimization problem using the Lagrangian method. 
The main innovation of the martingale technique is to transform the 
dynamic budget constraint into set of equivalent static ones. In other words, it is 
possible to decompose the nonlinear Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman  equation into a 
linear partial differential equation. 
Cox and Huang (1989) deals with the classical optimal portfolio-
consumption problem in continuous time under uncertainty. The problem dates 
 15
back to Merton (1971), who used a stochastic dynamic approach and found an 
analytical solution in particular cases by establishing a control and using the 
verification theorem of dynamic programming to verify its optimality. Although 
the problem is not new, the focus of Cox and Huang is on the explicit construction 
of optimal controls using martingale techniques, with the non-negativity 
constraints on consumption explicitly taken into account. A dynamic 
consumption-portfolio problem in continuous time with general diffusion price 
processes and a non-negativity constraint on consumption and final wealth is 
formulated. Some characterizations of the optimal policies are given, and closed-
form solutions are found for some particular cases. In particular, a solution is 
presented for the hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA) class of utility 
functions when prices follow a geometric Brownian motion. One advantage of 
this approach is that in the verification theorem linear partial differential 
equations arise. 
Merton approached the problem from a stochastic dynamic programming 
perspective that results in a nonlinear Hamilton-Jacob-Bellman (HJB) parabolic 
partial differential equation. Despite the strength of the HJB technique in general, 
the Merton’s solution has certain limitations: (i) dynamic programming can only 
be used to find an optimal solution if the derived utility function is continuously 
differentiable, and (ii) the nonlinear nature of the HJB equation renders it difficult 
to solve. Recent research by Kim and Omberg (1996) as well as by Brennan, 
Schwartz and Lagnado (1997) shows that the optimal portfolio weights do indeed 
depend on the investment horizon when the stock returns are predictable. Using a 
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log-linear approximation, Campbell and Viceira are able to characterize the 
portfolio demand under a stochastic opportunity set. One of their results is that the 
ratio of the proportion of bonds to stocks in the optimal portfolio increases with 
risk aversion. Sundaresan and Zapatero (1997) show that the asset allocation 
policies in which indexed (stochastic) liability is funded will exhibit systematic 
time variation depending on how close the market value of the assets are relative 
to the indexed liability. Liu (2002) derives a closed-form solution for the optimal 
portfolio weights in a stochastic opportunity setting when the default-free short 
rate follows the square root diffusion process. Wachter (2002) uses martingale 
methods to characterize the consumption and portfolio strategies in complete 
markets when stock returns are predictable. Chacko and Viceira develop portfolio 
and consumption rules under an incomplete market setting with stochastic 
volatility. They rely on an approximation scheme to solve the Bellman equation in 
their general applications. In only one special case are they able to find the exact 
solution. Kogan and Uppal (1999) provide approximation methods for solving  
consumption and portfolio problems in a continuous-time setting. They show 
applications drawn from both partial equilibrium and general equilibrium 
formulations. More recently, Cvitanic and Wang (2001) show that the modern 
approach to the problem of maximizing expected utility from terminal wealth in 
financial markets, namely the martingale/duality methodology, works also in the 
presence of proportional transactions costs. They demonstrate that the optimal 
terminal wealth is given as the inverse of marginal utility evaluated at the random 
variable which is optimal for an appropriately defined dual problem. 
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In the context of a representative ‘robust decision maker,’ where 
robustness implies a focus on worst-case scenarios over a restricted set of 
appropriately defined relevant model misspecifications, Trojani and Vanini 
(2002) present a version of a simple two-assets Merton (1969) model, and yield 
explicit and interpretable expressions for the relevant variables. The reference 
model is the standard geometric Brownian motion process while the maximal 
admissible distance there from is measured with a continuous time version of 
relative entropy. They find that the decompositions of the market price of risk in a 
standard consumption-based component and a further price for model uncertainty 
risk is independent of the underlying risk aversion parameter. 
The time-variation in the price of risk could be considered as a more 
promising possibility to explain the variation in stock market volatility. This leads 
to a model with a representative agent whose utility displays habit-formation. 
Campbell and Cochrane (1999), building on the work of Abel (1990) and 
Constantinides (1990), have proposed a simple asset pricing model of this kind. 
They suggest that assets are priced as if there were a representative agent whose 
utility is a power function of the difference between consumption and habit, 
where habit is a slow moving nonlinear average of past aggregate consumption. 
This function makes the agent more risk-averse in bad times, when consumption 
is low relative to its past history, than in good times, when consumption is high.  
In standard ‘internal habit’ models such as those in Constantinides (1990) 
and Sundaresan (1989), habit depends on an agent’s own consumption and the 
agent takes account of this when choosing how much to consume. On the other 
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hand, in ‘external habit’ models such as those in Abel (1990)  and Campbell and 
Cochrane (1999), habit depends on aggregate consumption that is unaffected by 
any one agent’s decisions. Despite the limitation of Abel’s framework due to the 
constant risk aversion, the model embeds three formations given certain values for 
parameters; namely, time-separable, ‘catching up with the Joneses’, and habit 
formation. It would be interesting to model the endowment fund’s utility function 
in the footsteps of Abel with a restriction on the parameter value, whereby the 
preference of the fund contains elements of ‘catching up with the Joneses’ and 
habit formation. University endowments, in the pursuit of making the institution 
more competitive in the region as well as nation, need to observe other 
endowments’ spending policies and habits in addition to the internal pressures to 
keep the spending streams as smooth as possible in the future. In addition, Abel’s 
postulate of the habit depending on one lag of consumption fits very well with the 
functioning of an endowment fund. 
Time-variation in the price of risk can also arise from the interaction of 
heterogeneous agents. Constantinides and Duffie (1996) develop a simple 
framework with many agents who have identical utility functions but 
heterogeneous streams of labor income. They show how changes in the cross-
sectional distribution of income can generate any desired behavior of the market 
price of risk. Dumas (1989), Grossman and Zhou (1996), Wang(1996), Sandroni 
(1997), and Chan and Kogan (2001) move in somewhat different direction by 
exploring the interactions of agents who have different levels of risk aversion. In 
particular, Chan and Kogan (2001) discuss the countercyclical nature of expected 
 19
stock returns due to investor heterogeneity in a setting where individuals have 
catching-up-with-the-Joneses preferences. While the authors rely on numerical 
analysis and focus on the dynamics of the conditional moments of stock returns, 
Kogan and Uppal (2001) derives an explicit asymptotic relation between the level 
of return volatility and the degree of cross-sectional heterogeneity. Kogan and 
Uppal develop a method to analyze analytically the equilibrium prices and 
policies in an economy with a stochastic investment opportunity set and 
incomplete financial markets, when agents have power utility over both 
intermediate consumption and terminal wealth. These methods could be used to 
study general equilibrium economies with portfolio constraints when there are 
multiple investors who differ in their risk aversion and hence the investment 
opportunity set evolves endogenously. Their model is flexible enough to be 
applied to an economy where agents exhibit habit persistence. They further 
assume that agents have time-additive power utility rather than the more general 
recursive preferences described in Kreps and Porteus (1978) and Duffie and 
Epstein (1992). Given that log-utility is a special case of the Kreps-Porteus 
specification of recursive utility, it is possible to extend the asymptotic method to 
the case of recursive preferences. 
2. 3.  Behavioral Finance 
Similar ideas have been introduced in the field of behavioral finance, 
which takes its roots from the experimental work of Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979)2. They argued that agents behave as if their utility function is kinked at a 
                                                         
2 Prospect theory is a descriptive model of decision making under risk, developed to help 
explain the numerous violations of the expected utility paradigm. 
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reference point which is close to the current level of wealth. Benartzi and Thaler 
(1995) postulated that Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory could explain the 
equity premium puzzle if agents frequently evaluate their utility and reset their 
reference points, so that the kink in utility increases their effective risk aversion. 
Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001), building on behavioral evidence of Thaler 
and Johnson (1990), argue that prospect theory should be extended to make 
agents effectively less risk averse if their wealth has recently risen, very much in 
the spirit of a habit-formation model. Even though Barberis et al. base the model 
on changing risk aversion just like Campbell and Cochrane, they introduce loss 
aversion over financial wealth fluctuations and allowing the degree of loss 
aversion to be affected by prior investment performance. The article by Barberis 
et al. is also related to the literature on first-order risk aversion, as introduced 
using recursive utility by Epstein and Zin (1990) among others. It is, however, 
different in that most implementations of first-order risk aversion affectively 
make the investor loss averse over total wealth fluctuations as opposed to 
financial wealth fluctuations. They also differ from another related work by Hong 
and Stein (1999), who suppose that investors are only able to process subsets of 
available information, by assuming that the investor remains rational and 
dynamically consistent. 
A number of empirical anomalies or puzzles have been discovered in 
financial markets that are apparently incompatible with what is regarded as 
rational behavior. Behavioral finance is viewed to be an emerging discipline that 
represents a collection of different approaches which seek to explain these 
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findings and perhaps refine our notions of rationality. In particular, it draws on the 
psychology and cognitive science literatures to consider how individual decision-
making often deviates from rational choice in systematic ways. This may simply 
reflect limited intelligence or what economists refer to as bounded rationality, 
being a human inability to numerically evaluate decisions under uncertainty 
accurately. More importantly, the observed anomalies give rise to alternative 
behavioral explanations that are difficult to rationalize in expected utility terms 
but are systematic and potentially derived from the recognition that the way in 
which a decision is framed is critical or that social interaction is an important 
element in any market process. Herd behavior is a classical example whereby a 
social phenomenon is closely linked to the growth of speculative bubbles as 
witnessed during the last couple of years particularly in the technology sector. 
The notion of regret aversion may encourage investor herding behavior to invest 
in respected corporations as these investments carry implicit insurance against 
regret. Regret aversion may also impact on the behavior of professional fund 
managers, who may sell loss-making stocks before the end of a quarter to avoid 
having to explain to investors why they are holding funds in poorly performing 
shares of stocks. 
As stressed by Conlisk (1996), the failure to incorporate bounded 
rationality into economic models is just bad economics -  the equivalent to 
presuming the existence of a free lunch. Since we have only so much brainpower, 
and only so much time, we cannot be expected to solve difficult problems 
optimally. It is eminently rational for people to adopt rules of thumb as a way to 
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economize on cognitive faculties. Departures from rationality emerge both in 
judgments (beliefs) and in choice. Some examples of the way in which judgment 
diverges from rationality include overconfidence, optimism, anchoring, and 
extrapolation. Many of the departures from rational choice are captured by 
prospect theory and its key theoretical components that incorporate important 
features of psychology. There are three features of the prospect theory value 
function: 
(i) It is defined over changes to wealth rather than levels of wealth, as 
in the expected utility framework, to incorporate the concept of 
adaptation. 
(ii) The loss function is steeper than the gain function to incorporate 
the notion of loss aversion, the notion that people are more 
sensitive to decreases in their well being than to increases. 
(iii) Both the gain and loss function display diminishing sensitivity to 
reflect experimental findings, the gain function is concave and the 
loss function is convex. 
 Regarding the rationality of investors, Schleifer (2000) describes a wealth 
of behavioral finance research showing that investors are not Bayesian and that 
their judgments and decisions are systematically influenced by how a problem is 
framed. Further, he provides evidence that these individual investors are 
systematic, thereby laying the groundwork for his development of a theory of 
investor sentiment, which he argues is one of the two essential inputs to 
behavioral finance theory. Schleifer also reviews the evidence suggesting that 
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under- and overreaction to information are due to the behavioral heuristics of 
representativeness and conservatism. To fully describe choices, however, prospect 
theory often needs to be combined with an understanding of ‘mental accounting.’ 
One needs to understand when individuals faced with separate gambles treat them 
as separate gains and losses; and when they treat them as one, pooling them to 
produce one gain or loss. Mental accounting could be viewed as a heuristics for 
reducing complexity. Tversky and Kahneman (1981) introduced the concept of 
‘mental account’, according to which people keep not only a mental tab on the 
totality of all projects and their consequences but also a separate mental account 
in respect of each of their plans. They postulate that people focus on one account 
in particular when weighing things up; relationships with other commitments or 
accounts are usually ignored. 
 Interestingly, the notion of different ‘mental accounts’ could help explain 
the difference between the regret aversion and loss aversion that is considered to 
be a fuzzy difference, to say the least. One could pose the following question; if 
regret aversion signifies the fear of regretting decisions after the event3, then what 
is the difference between compared with loss aversion? The difference becomes 
clear when one remembers that regret may also occur when a particular decision 
has not been made. Had we, for instance, not bought a particular share, against the 
advice of a friend, and the share then turns out to be a winner, then regret kicks in, 
even though there was no actual loss. Not acting is a decision – you choose to not 
act. On the one hand, there are ‘payment affect’ mental accounts to which the 
                                                         
3 See Loomes and Sugden (1982 and 1987) for details on regret aversion and related 
issues. 
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actual money is booked. On the other hand, people also keep ‘non-payment 
effect’ mental accounts, which record those sums that might have been received if 
a particular decision had not been made, which means that these payments do not 
affect the actual state of the capital. Gains foregone take the place of a loss in the 
case of evaluation of a non-payment effect project; the relative gain, on the other 
hand, will be replaced by the loss not incurred. Dissonance occurs when the 
decision against the project is regretted because it would have produced a profit. 
The degree of regret aversion, as with loss aversion, can be seen from the increase 
in the non-payment effect ‘regret function’ in the vicinity of the reference point. 
The dissonance is great and the regret aversion pronounced if the decision against 
the project was accompanied by considerable commitment. As with loss aversion, 
a decision maker anticipates the dissonance when considering the realization of a 
particular project. If there is agreement that a commitment a priori leads to 
distortions and therefore that all decisions must be made free from any 
commitment as far as possible, then any problems arising from regret aversion 
will be resolved of their own accord. I would argue that people should try to keep 
their own commitments to a minimum to be able to make decisions free from 
regret or loss aversion. Moreover, the perception of a possible deficit results in 
risk aversion from a ‘need for control’ perspective as regret or loss aversion  is 
from a ‘need to be free from dissonance’ perspective. 
 Shefrin and Statman (2000) developed ‘behavioral portfolio theory 
(BPT)4’ as an alternative to the descriptive version of the Markowitz mean-
                                                         
4 BPT is a positive portfolio theory built on the foundations of Security 
Potential/Aspiration (SP/A) theory due to Lopes (1987) and prospect theory. Formally, 
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variance portfolio. Mean-variance investors evaluate portfolios as a whole; they 
consider covariance between assets as they construct their portfolios. Mean-
variance investors also have consistent attitudes toward risk; they are always 
averse to risk. Behavioral investors build portfolios as pyramids of assets, layer by 
layer. The layers are associated with particular goals and particular attitudes 
toward risk. Some money is in the downside-protection layer, designed to avoid 
poverty; other money is in the upside-potential layer, designed for a shot at being 
rich. Alternatively, some money could be in the regret-minimization layer 
invested in index funds; and others in the diversification-maximization layer 
invested in absolute return strategies. Specifically BPT investors choose portfolios 
by considering expected wealth, desire for security and potential, aspiration 
levels, and probabilities of achieving aspiration levels. 
2. 4.  Compensation of Investment Managers 
There has been a growing body of literature that studies mutual fund 
tournaments both theoretically and empirically. On the empirical side, Brown, 
Harlow, and Starks (1996), Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and Kosky and Pontiff 
(1999) provide evidence that the mutual fund tournament generates incentives for 
managers not to act in the best interest of investors. Assuming that managers are 
evaluated on a calendar year basis, Brown et al. demonstrate that mid-year losers 
increase fund volatility in the latter part of the year relative to the mid-year 
winners. Chevalier and Ellison study how relative performance after three 
quarters of the year influence investment strategy in the last quarter. Considering 
                                                                                                                                                                       
the mechanics underlying the optimization in SP/A theory can be viewed as an adaptation 
of the Arzac-Bawa (1977) characterization of the safety-first theory, where the major 
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two-year-old funds, they show that funds that are somewhat behind the market 
increase risk to a greater extent than funds that are ahead of the market. Kosky 
and Pontiff (1999) show that changes in risk are less severe for funds that use 
derivatives. 
 These studies assume that changes in risk in the last part of the year 
depend on the difference between the realized return and a benchmark return over 
the first part of the year. Therefore, these studies differentiate the behavior of 
funds ahead of the benchmark from those behind the benchmark after the first part 
of the year. Closely related theoretical papers studying relative performance 
evaluation in financial markets are those of Huddart (1999), Hvide (1999), and 
Palomino (1999) who consider a game played by several fund managers. Hvide 
and Palomino study the consequences of relative performance objective in the 
context of a single investment decision. Hvide shows that in a situation with 
moral hazard on both effort and risk, standard tournament rewards induce 
excessive risk and lack of effort. Palomino assumes that managers with different 
levels of information compete in oligopolistic markets and aim at maximizing 
their relative performance against the average performance in their category. He 
shows that despite the objective function being linear in performances, managers 
have incentives to choose overly-risky strategies. Huddart considers a two-period 
model in which interim performances are observable. He shows that asset-based 
compensation schemes generate incentives for managers to invest in overly-risky 
portfolio in the first period, and that performance fees align managers’ incentives 
with those of investors.  
                                                                                                                                                                       
difference is in the interpretation of the variables. 
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Das and Sundaram (1998) consider a model in which fund managers use 
fee structures to signal their higher ability. They provide conditions under which 
investors are better off under an incentive fee regime than a ‘fulcrum’ fee regime, 
which refers to the fund manager’s fee being symmetric around a chosen index. 
Contrary to the belief that option-like incentive fee structures hurt investors by 
inducing managers to take ‘excessive’ amounts of risk, they find that, in many 
circumstances, investors can be made better off in welfare terms by requiring that 
only asymmetric fees be used. Their model is akin to a principal-agent game in 
which the agent (the manager) sets the compensation contract, and the principal 
(the investor) responds by deciding on the amount of resources (funds) to be 
invested with the agent. 
 Grinblatt and Titman (1989) assume that managers can risklessly capture 
the value of any option implicit in their payoff structure by hedging in their 
personal portfolios. This enables the use of results from option pricing theory in 
characterizing the fee maximizing level of risk for any given contract structure. 
Among other things, they demonstrate that for certain classes of portfolio 
strategies, adverse risk-sharing incentives are avoided when the penalties for poor 
performance outweigh the rewards for good performance. Goetzmann, Ingersoll, 
and Ross (2001) are concerned with ‘high watermark’ contracts of the sort 
frequently used by hedge funds in which the manager receives a proportion of the 
fund return each year in excess of the portfolio’s previous high water mark, which 
is defined as the maximum share value since the inception of the fund. The 
authors provide a closed-form solution for the value of such contracts and show 
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that such contracts are valuable to hedge fund managers and represent a claim on 
a significant portion of investor wealth. 
 Heinkel and Stoughton (1994) employ a two-period model with moral 
hazard and adverse selection. They show that the equilibrium set of contracts in 
their model features a smaller performance-based fee in the first period than in a 
first-best contract. They furthermore suggest that this reduced emphasis on the 
performance component in the first period is analogous to the lack of a 
performance-based fee in many parts of the asset management industry. Admati 
and Pfleiderer (1997) consider a scenario where the fund manager has superior 
information to the investor and faces a fulcrum fee structure. They examine if 
there are any conditions under which the manager would pick the investor’s most 
desired portfolio. Nevertheless, they are not concerned with determining 
equilibrium fee structures and portfolios.  
Contrary to the tournament hypothesis, Chen and Pennacchi (1999) 
provide a theoretical model for risk-taking assuming that fund managers are 
evaluated with respect to an exogenous benchmark index and show that poor 
performing funds do not necessarily increase the volatility of their fund’s returns.  
2. 5.  Alternative Forms of Utility Functions 
 Despite the widespread popularity and analytical tractability of the power 
utility function, the fact that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is the 
reciprocal of the coefficient of relative risk aversion; i.e., there exists a one-to-one 
mapping between the parameters, inspired many to think of alternative functional 
forms. Epstein and Zin (1989, 1991) and Weil (1989), using the theoretical 
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framework of Kreps and Porteus (1978), have proposed a more general utility 
specification, called recursive utility, that preserves the scale-invariance of power 
utility but breaks the tight link between the coefficient of relative risk aversion 
and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Risk aversion in our setting 
describes the university endowment’s reluctance to substitute spending across 
states of the world, whereas the elasticity of intertemporal substitution describes 
the institution’s willingness to substitute consumption over time (low values 
imply dislike for consumption growth). 
 Epstein and Zin investigate to what extent first order risk aversion, based 
on Kreps-Porteus preferences, can explain the size and predictability of risk 
premia typically observed in securities markets. In the case of second order risk 
aversion, approximating von Neumann-Morgenstern utility by a Taylor series, the 
risk premium is approximately linear in the variance of small risks. The utility 
functional is said to exhibit first order risk aversion if the utility functional is 
approximately linear in the standard deviation of small risks. Before Epstein-Zin’s 
introduction of recursive utility into the literature the benchmark was in the form 
of 
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If f is linear, the Epstein-Zin framework collapses to the original benchmark 
equation. The habit formation could be reconciled within the framework of 
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A variation of the habit formation utility function is the idea, that people 
care mostly about how rich they are relative to their neighbors rather than their 
own past. Abel (1990) introduced the so-called Catching-up-with-the-Joneses 
framework to capture this belief. He basically assumes external habit formation, 
whereby agents care about the ratio of consumption to habit, rather than the 
difference. As a result, risk aversion is constant and risk premia do not vary 
through time. Formally, this is captured by the same utility function as the one 
used for defining habit formation, except that Xt  is now a function of (present 
and) past aggregate consumption rather than past own consumption.  
Expected utility  theory  assumes that the investor can compute  
expectations with respect to the return distribution, which requires that the agent 
knows the parametric structure of the return distribution and either knows its 
parameters or can form Bayesian beliefs about them. The investor is only exposed 
to the risk inherent in the returns and trades off this risk against expected rewards 
through the expected utility maximization. Knight (1921) and Ellsberg (1961) 
argue, however, that the investor may not have all of the information required to 
form such expectations. An agent may not be able or willing to assign 
probabilities to a set of alternative parameterizations of the return distribution. 
Thus, the investor faces additional ambiguity that is not captured in the expected 
utility framework. Ambiguity aversion preferences formalize the idea that 
investor dislikes not only risk but also this more vague uncertainty about the 
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world, called Knightian uncertainty. Nonadditive probabilities or Choquet 
capacities are alternative formalizations of Knightian uncertainty or ambiguity 
that are closely related to maxmin expected utility. In this case, following Dow 
and Werlang (1992), the investor’s portfolio choice problem is given by: 
( )( )1max min |
t
p t t t t
p
E v W R Z
α
α +∈℘
 ′  , where ( ).v  is the typical CRRA utility 
function. The interpretation of this maxmin criterion is as follows: Given the 
complete ambiguity about the return distribution, the investor considers the worst 
case outcome through the interior minimization. The exterior maximization 
achieves the usual risk versus expected reward trade-off. The implementation of 
the ambiguity aversion requires the need for the characterization of a set of 
possible return distributions. Ellsberg (1961) introduced the so-called ε-
contamination parametrization: 
( ){ }1 :P p p pε ε= − + ∈℘ , where 
℘ denotes the σ-algebra generated by the support of the return 
distribution, and p  could be the empirical return distribution. The parameter 
ε reflects the investor’s degree of ambiguity. If 0ε = , the investor’s objective 
function reduces to that with standard CRRA preferences and the empirical return 
distribution. 
There is an extensive experimental literature confirming that individuals 
dislike ambiguity in financial markets; e.g., Camerer and Kunreuther (1989) or 
Sarin and Weber (1993). The crucial difference between ambiguity aversion and 
expected utility theory with model uncertainty is that with ambiguity aversion the 
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investor cannot or does not want to assign probabilities to the set of alternative 
return distributions. Agents are uncertain about the true model and are unable or 
unwilling to assign probabilities to the set of alternative models. Ambiguity 
aversion is said to be related to the recent literature on robustness5 such as 
Anderson, Hansen and Sargent (2000) and Maenhout (2001). 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) argue that humans systematically violate 
the axioms of expected utility theory in two important ways. First, experimental 
subjects tend to overweight outcomes that are considered certain, relative to 
outcomes that are merely probable, which is referred to as the certainty effect. In 
financial markets, this certainty effect make an investor risk averse in the case of 
gains, as a small certain gain is preferred to a probable risky gain, but risk seeking 
in the case of losses, as a probable risky loss is preferred to a small certain loss. In 
addition, subjects tend to simplify decisions by disregarding components common 
to the alternative choices and focusing on components that differentiate the 
choices, which is called the cancellation effect. They formulate prospect theory 
based on this experimental evidence. This theory consists of an editing stage, 
where alternatives are put into perspective, and a choice stage. Utility is defined 
over gains and losses relative to a reference point rather than over the level of 
wealth as in expected utility theory. Tversky and Kahneman (1992) propose the 
following objective function for the choice stage in order to capture the 
differential risk preferences over gains and losses generated by the certainty 
effect: 
                                                         
5 Robustness was pioneered in economics by Hansen and Sargent (1995). 
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( ) ( )1 1 bt tv W l W W+ += − −  if  1tW W +>   
( ) ( )1 1 bt tv W W W+ += − , otherwise. 
W  is a reference wealth level determined in the editing stage. It could be 
the initial wealth or its future value, depending on the investor’s perspective. The 
parameter l measures the investor’s loss aversion and the parameter b captures the 
degree of risk seeking over losses and risk aversion over gains. The kink at the 
origin introduced by l > 1 makes losses (relatively) more painful than gains are 
pleasurable. 
In addition, the investor in the Tversky and Kahneman framework does 
not evaluate outcomes on the basis of true probabilities, but on the basis of 
distorted probabilities. Instead of maximizing the true expectation of the objective 
function, the investor maximizes: 
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where ( ).π  represents a subjective distortion of the objective probabilities 
( ).p . The authors suggest parameterizing this probability distortion as: 
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c determines the degree of irrationality. When c=1, the decision weights 
( ).π  reduce to the objective probabilities p(.). 
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A special case of prospect theory is loss aversion, when b=1, c=1 and l>1. 
In this case, the investor is risk neutral over gains and is risk neutral over losses, 
but realizes a greater incremental utility penalty for a loss than for an equally 
large gain. This results in unconditional risk aversion. Furthermore, since with 
c=1 the decision weights reduce to the objective probabilities, this investor simply 
maximizes expected utility. Benartzi and Thaler (1995) find that the main aspect 
of prospect theory relevant for  portfolio choice is loss aversion and that the 
concavity (convexity) of the value function on the upside (downside), as well as 
the subjectivity of the probability distortions, are only of second-order 
importance. Sharpe (1998) argues that the local risk-neutrality property of loss 
aversion results in portfolio choices that are too extreme due to the fact that the 
iso-expected utility curves are straight lines in mean versus standard deviation of 
returns space. Furthermore, Benartzi and Thaler explain that the more often a 
loss-averse investor evaluates his or her portfolio, the less attractive are high 
expected return but high variance investments because losses of these investments 
are realized more often at short horizons than at long horizons. Thus, loss 
aversion causes short-term investors to be extremely risk averse, since the return 
distribution straddles the kink of the utility function, but long-term investors to be 
almost risk neutral, as the mass of the return distribution moves away from the 
kink. 
2. 6. International Diversification 
Reflecting the trend toward a greater integration of world capital markets, 
international diversification of investment portfolios has, for the last several years, 
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received widespread attention at both the academic and practitioner levels. Recent 
ex ante international portfolio selection studies, including Jorion (1985) and Eun 
and Resnick (1988) have shown: (i) that it is important to control parameter 
uncertainty in order to capture the potential gains from international 
diversification; and (ii) that hedging foreign exchange risk can increase the gains 
from international stock portfolio diversification. In other words, investors can 
substantially benefit from international equity diversification when they properly 
control foreign exchange and parameter uncertainties. When neither of these 
uncertainties are controlled, however, investors may not be able to realize enough 
of the potential benefits to justify international investment. Recently, Eun and 
Resnick (1994) extended the work on international portfolio selection to 
portfolios of stocks, bonds, and stocks and bonds. They show that when exchange 
rate risk is hedged with forward contracts, the risk-return relationship is very 
much improved over unhedged international portfolio investment for bond 
portfolios and stock and bond portfolios, but only minimal improvement is 
obtained for stock portfolios. Glen and Jorion (1993) compare portfolios with an 
optimal combination of forward contracts versus a fully hedged strategy and 
portfolios hedged using the ‘universal’ hedge ratio of Black (1990). Using a world 
bond index and a world stock index, currency exposure is conditionally managed 
using a strategy for taking a long or short position in forward contracts based only 
on prior information. They find statistically significant improvement over 
unhedged investment in the world bond index, but not for the world stock index.  
For neither the world bond index nor stock index do they obtain significant 
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improvement over a simple fully hedged strategy. The hedging strategies 
employed in most previous studies can be viewed as ‘passive’ because exchange 
rate uncertainty was unconditionally hedged with forward contracts, without 
regard to a forecast of the home currency depreciation or appreciating  versus the 
foreign currencies. Early empirical studies (Frenkel, 1981) concluded the forward 
premium was an unbiased predictor of the future change of the spot exchange 
rate. Indeed, Levich (1982) found the forward rate to be a more accurate predictor 
of the direction of spot rate changes than the forecast provided by most 
forecasting services. Fama (1984) discovered that the forward rate to contain a 
risk premium that is time varying as well as the expectations component. Since 
his work, it has been generally agreed that forward prices are not unbiased 
predictors. Nevertheless, Shapiro (1992) states that the risk premium appears to 
change sings, being positive at some times and negative at other times, and 
averages near zero. Therefore, he thinks that it would not be stretching things to 
treat the forward rate as an unbiased forecast of the future spot rate. 
An alternative model is that spot exchange rates follow a pure random 
walk. According to this model, the best estimate of next period’s rate is the 
current spot exchange rate.  In empirical tests, Meese and Rogoff (1983) find that 
the random walk model performs as well as any forecasting model for 1-2 month 
horizons for certain major currencies, which suggests a possible conditional 
trading strategy.  That is, sell the foreign currency proceeds forward only when 
the forward rate is at a premium to the spot rate. The intuition is that the investor 
will be ‘locking-in’ a higher sales price at the forward rate than the expected spot 
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rate. Eaker and Grant (1990) provide some preliminary evidence suggesting that 
this selective hedging strategy, coupled with international equity investment made 
according to fixed allocation rules, is superior to always hedging the currency risk 
in international equity portfolios using forward contracts. 
This classical hedging approach used an OLS procedure which assumes 
that the joint distribution of cash and futures price changes remains constant over 
time. However, a substantial body of evidence indicates that the covariance 
matrix of cash and futures is time-varying. Recent empirical work has focused on 
utilizing that dynamic covariance structure to derive time-varying hedge ratios. 
For example, Cecchetti et al. (1988) proposed a hedging model for financial 
futures based on the univariate autoregressive conditional heteroscedastic 
(ARCH) model introduced by Engle (1982). They assumed that the conditional 
correlation between cash and futures prices is constant, and report significant 
evidence of time-variation in the optimal hedge ratios. Myers (1991), Baillie and 
Myers (1991), and Sephton (1993) used the bivariate generalized ARCH 
(GARCH) model of Bollerslev (1986) to capture the time-variation of hedge 
ratios for agricultural commodities and report improved hedging performance 
using this approach. Kroner and Claessens (1991) illustrate the usefulness of the 
GARCH technique for hedging exchange-rate risk associated with external debt. 
Kroner and Sultan (1993) apply the bivariate GARCH framework to minimize 
exchange-rate risk using currency futures. These studies offer strong evidence of 
time variation in hedge ratios and show that, in at least some cases, substantial 
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improvements in hedging performance can be realized by following a dynamic 
hedging strategy. 
I postulate that optimal hedge ratio analysis needs to be updated whenever 
the assumptions underlying its construction change. Thus, intertemporal 
management of the overall portfolio construction process seems to be the 
reasonable approach. On the other hand, it is the degree of certainty in the optimal 
hedge ratio that increases with a higher allocation into international assets not the 
hedge ratio itself. 
2. 7. Currency Hedging 
Perold and Schulman (1988) advocated the view that currency hedging is 
a free lunch implying that 100% of foreign currency exposures should be 
optimally hedged. The argument is that hedging results in expected returns of zero 
with a reduction in risk of a position. The analysis is based on quarterly real (CPI 
inflation adjusted) returns over 1978-87, and shows that the risk reduction is still 
large when domestic purchasing power is taken into account. Their 
recommendation does not necessarily provide maximal risk reduction, as there is 
no consideration of cross-hedging or optimal hedge ratio analysis. Finally, the 
authors also note the lack of precision of hedge ratio estimates, which are 
essentially regression coefficients, a theme we return to below. Eun and Resnick 
(1988) find empirical evidence that the performance of international stock 
portfolios is increased if 100% of the exposure is hedged against currency risk. 
These two studies are instrumental for the first currency overlay mandate to have 
a 100% hedged benchmark for the performance measurement. An opposite view 
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is proposed by Black (1990) who demonstrated by assuming the validity of 
Siegel’s paradox and homogenous preferences of investors that investors 
worldwide share ‘universal’ currency hedge ratios, which he demonstrated in a 
general equilibrium framework to be strictly below 100%. Black postulates that 
currencies need to be considered as asset classes in international portfolios that 
provide correlation structures with impact on diversification. The theoretical 
framework that underpins Black’s analysis is a highly stylised real international 
capital asset pricing model.  In the Black framework, all investors (regardless of 
domicile) have the same hedge ratio, and every investor holds the same 
diversified portfolio of world equities. Since there must be a borrower for every 
lender and currency longs for every short, in equilibrium, asset returns (and their 
volatilities and correlations) will adjust until all available equities are willingly 
held and some investor is willing to take each side of all currency contracts. Adler 
and Prasad (1992) weaken some of the underlying assumptions and generalize 
Black’s result by substituting universal hedges with regression hedges. Glen and 
Jorion (1993), and Kritzman (1993a) are examples of the use of mean-variance 
optimization as a cost-benefit analysis for currency hedging. The risk-minimizing 
hedge ratio becomes 100% plus or minus a component that is determined by the 
covariances of the forward currency returns with excess returns from the domestic 
and international parts of the portfolio. The cost of hedging includes the cost of 
forward contracts and the costs associated with the periodic portfolio rebalancing 
that is necessary to maintain the hedge.  Indirect costs include the small return 
that one can expect from bearing currency risk (Black, 1990), which is lost when 
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all currency exposure is hedged. Finally, the clear benefit of hedging is risk 
reduction. Furthermore, increasing the cost of hedging or decreasing the risk 
aversion will always make the optimal hedge ratio lower. If a portfolio holds high 
proportion of domestic equity, and these assets perform poorly in times when the 
domestic currency is strong, then it is particularly dangerous to be exposed to risk 
from currency exposure for this will further the negative returns when the 
domestic currency is strong. Since the forward returns are for a long international 
currency and short domestic currency exposure, however, the correlation between 
currency and assets have the opposite effect on the optimal hedge ratio for 
domestic and international asset exposure.  A common argument for using a low 
or zero hedge ratio for an equity portfolio has been that the strength of an equity 
market is likely to be negatively correlated with the strength of the currency. If 
the fund is predominately invested in domestic equity assets, then this correlation 
argument actually leads to a higher hedge ratio. That is, if international currency 
strength is positively correlated with international asset strength, then the optimal 
hedge ratio will increase, while a positive correlation between domestic currency 
strength and domestic asset strength will decrease the optimal hedge ratio. 
Froot (1993) argues for a zero hedge ratio over long investment horizons. 
His analysis is based on estimates of asset return second moments over a 200 year 
sample. For international equity and exchange rate data that span the modern 
floating exchange rate period (1973-present), there are only five to six non-
overlapping periods of 5-year returns. This makes any analysis based on the 
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estimation of means and variances of long-dated asset returns over the last thirty 
years of post Bretton Woods data suspect. 
Gardner and Stone (1995) argue, on the basis of stochastic simulations, 
that the estimation of portfolio shares from mean-variance optimization problems, 
whereby they have such wide confidence intervals that they are suspect for policy 
analysis (i.e. confidence bands for the hedge ratio for each currency can often be 
above 100 per cent or below 0 per cent). They find that the sampling variability 
issues are most acute for estimates of expected asset returns. In a specialized 
example, where only minimum variance hedging is considered, the authors’ 
estimated hedge ratios are precise enough for hedging policy purposes. In a 
related paper, Gardner and Wuilloud (1995) argue that, if the investment horizon 
is short, say one to two years, and the investor has moderate to low risk aversion, 
there is a substantial probability that the optimal hedge ratio will underperform 
another portfolio that makes use of a simple alternative hedging strategy.  In other 
words, the international investor will frequently experience regret, which could be 
large in magnitude. Since the authors set up the optimal hedge ratio to involve 
expected currency return, it is not surprising that regret can be quite large. The 
authors then recommend a 50 per cent hedge ratio, as it minimizes the maximal 




Optimal Asset Allocation and Spending Rules 
 
3. 1. Introduction 
Managers of endowment funds are particularly concerned about the 
downside risks of their investments because of their fiduciary responsibilities to 
balance today’s spending and future growth of the portfolio. They have to make 
sure they generate enough return to cover both the inflation and spending rate. 
The main objective of university endowments could be stated as providing 
adequate spending for current and future beneficiaries while not eroding the 
principal base (corpus) of the endowment. Litvack, Malkiel, and Quandt (1974) 
suggest that endowment funds should separate the investment decisions from the 
spending decisions of the university, protect the real value of the endowment fund 
and stabilize spendable income. 
The perceptions of myopic and long-term investors toward asset allocation 
could have striking differences that outline the true meaning and purpose of 
investments. An investment entity with a long-term investment horizon (infinite 
in theory) and a goal based on spending stream, such as a university endowment, 
should recognize the ability of the fixed-income investments to hedge against 
future changes in the investment opportunity set or to provide consistent income 
stream for spending requirements particularly during bear markets, whereas a 
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myopic investor treats a long-term fixed-income investment as simply another 
risky asset6. 
This chapter tackles the following question: “What is the optimal asset 
allocation strategy, which will maximize the expected utility of beneficiaries?” By 
the principles of prudence and fairness, fiduciaries of endowment funds have the 
obligation not to discriminate between generations. This dual goal of treating 
current and future beneficiaries of the endowment fairly and equally entails the 
endowment manager to take portfolio positions that would provide adequate 
spending today without jeopardizing the growth of the portfolio going forward. 
The main issue is to determine what the appropriate benchmark is that 
incorporates the trade-off between current spending and the prudent growth of the 
corpus (spending later for the benefit of future generations). 
Major and minor needs of ‘current’ and ‘future’ beneficiaries of the 
endowment are to get a smooth spending stream (major for both), to grow the 
spending stream at least by inflation (major for both) and to outperform a given 
benchmark (minor for current, but major for future). The third point illustrates a 
significant conflict of interest, where endowments end up maximizing suboptimal 
objectives. We have to remember the fact that being impatient for the current 
spending would be detrimental to the chances of the future generations receiving 
the same ‘real’ income. On the other hand, it might be necessary to treat the 
donation streams as a stochastic process for they might justify higher spending 
today given a reasonable approximation. Altshuler (2000) argues for increased 
spending on academic programs and faculty today to turn the accumulated 
                                                         
6 Refer to Brennan et al. (1997) for further details. 
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endowment wealth into intellectual capital for the university. Moreover, 
Hansmann (1998)7, citing the evidence of significant stock price appreciation 
during the 1990’s, questions the low spending rates offered to academic programs 
and postulates that endowment managers are giving more attention to portfolio 
management and growth of the endowment fund at the expense of prudent 
spending rate policies. He, further, argues that financial gift flows are much 
smoother eliminating the need for a big endowment to smooth out the bulkiness 
of financial gifts. The distribution of spending equitably across generations8 
involves an implicit assumption of the productivity of academic creativity and 
research growing linearly at the minimum. Large buffer levels in endowment 
funds despite the mean reversion witnessed in the stock market during the last 
year makes a case for higher spending rates at least in the next couple of years. 
Nevertheless, I think the simultaneous dynamic management of spending rates 
and portfolio allocation rules should be the preferred approach in conjunction 
with the flow of donations9. 
 This chapter deals with the construction of a continuous-time model 
integrating the unique properties of endowment management process. Merton 
(1993) has developed the first most significant continuous-time model to address 
the complicated problem of optimal investment strategies for endowment funds. 
The derivations are based on an intertemporal consumption and portfolio selection 
model and optimal expenditures and allocation rules are derived in this very 
                                                         
7 Hansmann (1990) is the first to address this issue for universities. 
8 This principle is referred to as ‘intergenerational equity.’ 
9 The inclusion of exogenous donation stream is an intended area of further research and 
theoretical development. 
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general framework that includes nonendowed funds as part of the university’s 
available resources. Thaler and Williamson (1994) proposed an asymmetric 
rebalancing strategy, whereby an endowment fund would rebalance back to the 
initial 60/40 mix of stocks and bonds if the return on stocks has been less than the 
return on bonds at the end of the year. However, if stocks outperform bonds there 
is no rebalancing triggered. In either case, the strategy is consistent with a higher 
return expectation for stocks over bonds. It is a momentum strategy only if the 
stocks are outperforming bonds (could be called a ‘conditional momentum’ 
strategy). The authors, by providing historical evidence, argue that the rewards of 
this strategy could be substantial. Dybvig (1999), using the results in Dybvig 
(1995), postulates that withdrawals from an endowment fund could be sustained 
by using TIPS (Treasury Inflation Protection Securities) in conjunction with a 
risky investment. 
In this chapter, I use a simple continuous-time model and try to capture the 
essential characteristics of dynamic spending and allocation rules of endowment 
funds. This endowment fund is characterized by an HARA utility function with a 
minimum subsistence level that increases with the inflation rate. The dynamic 
framework for the stochastic prices is a Black/Scholes type. The optimal spending 
and portfolio allocation rules are derived explicitly which allows extensive 
comparative static interpretations and easy numerical simulations. 
3. 2. Framework 












∫ ). For any date 0t > , the period return on the 
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bill, tB , is given by 
rte . On the other hand, the stock index price process follows a 
geometric Brownian motion, with drift µ  and variance 2σ ; i.e., the traditional 











 is the instantaneous change in the stock price, and tW  is a standard 
Brownian motion. The return from holding the risky asset is a pure capital gain.  
The key properties of Brownian motion are the following: 
(i) Continuity: Brownian motion has continuous paths. 
(ii) Independent, normally distributed increments: If 
0 10 kt t t≤ < < <K , then the increments 
1 0 2 1 1( ) ( ), ( ) ( ), , ( ) ( )k kW t W t W t W t W t W t −− − −K  are independent , 
and each increment 1( ) ( )j jW t W t −− is a normal variable with mean 
zero and variance 1j jt t −− .  
(iii) Markov property: If 0 s t≤ < are given, then conditioned on the 
information obtained by observing the Brownian motion until time 
s, the conditional distribution of W(t) depends only on the value of 
W(s). 
                                                         
10 This model implies that the value of the stock obeys a lognormal distribution at all 















(iv) Martingale property: If 0 s t≤ < are given, then conditioned on the 
information obtained by observing the Brownian motion until time 
s, the conditional expectation of W(t) is W(s). 
(v) Quadratic variation: If 0t > is given, and one partitions the interval 
[ ]0, t  by choosing  partition points 0 10 kt t t t= ≤ ≤ ≤ =K , then as 
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Existence and uniqueness of risk-neutral probability Q are characterized 
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 The state space of uncertainty is denoted by Ω , whose elements w are 
states of nature which specify the complete realization of w on [0,T]. The 
collection of distinguishable events is the Borel sigma field of Ω , denoted by ℑ , 
and the probability belief is the Wiener measure on ( ),Ω ℑ  called P. The 
martingale approach requires the transformation of ( ), , PΩ ℑ  into ( ), ,QΩ ℑ . 
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  The assumed utility function belongs to the family of hyperbolic absolute 
risk aversion (HARA) functions. It could be interpreted as a utility function with a 
subsistence level tY  that is a deterministic function of time. In addition, it is in the 
class of homothetic functions11 with a time varying habit or subsistence level, 
similar to the habit formation structure articulated by Constantinides (1990) and 
Campbell and Cochrane (1999). 
(3.4) ( ) ( )11
1t t t t







 This representation could be thought of as a restriction to a particular class 
of HARA functions with decreasing absolute risk aversion; i.e., 0γ > 12.  
The subsistence level is the minimum spending level a given endowment 





where the growth rate is rπ < , indicating a constant inflation rate that is always 
lower than the constant risk-free rate. 0 1α< <  represents the spending rate based 
on inflation-adjusted initial endowment value, V0. In particular, tY is positive, 
implying a decreasing relative risk aversion (DRRA).  
3. 3. Optimization Program and Optimal Spending Stream 
 Assume a university endowment fund with a self-financing strategy 
(constraint)13 is maximizing a HARA utility function in an infinite time horizon 
                                                         
11 There is no one-to-one mapping between the ratio of marginal utilities and the rate of 
time preference (or the intertemporal elasticity of substitution) in the case of homothetic 
functions, which do not include the quadratic and the CARA class. 
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framework. For endowments, the self-financing constraint could be re-written 
under the assumption of complete markets, which is satisfied under the given 
framework of one Brownian motion, two non-redundant securities and continuous 
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where 0V  is the initial endowment value, 0ρ >  is the time-preference for 
spending today15, tY are the control variables, and E
* denotes expectation under 
risk-neutral probability.  
We should note that in the case of endowment funds, the spending Yt 
should be understood as a spending stream. An application of the Euler’s theorem 
is required to solve the optimization program: 
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12 The case of 0γ <  implies increasing absolute risk aversion, which is found to be 
unrealistic in practical situations. We postulate that the rise in the endowment size would 
be accompanied by more allocation in the risky asset, and not vice versa. 
13 ( )1t t tt t t
t t t
dV dS dB
x x Y dt
V S B
= + − −  
14 See Cox and Huang (1989) and Karatzas, Lehoczky and Shreve (1987) for details. 
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− + 16. 
The constant k is found from the constraint: 
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There are technical conditions for the optimization program to converge. 
The first technical condition implies that the initial wealth allocation should be 
greater than the discounted future spending under the risk neutral probability, 











V E e Y dt






















Thus, 00 0 0( )
V




> ⇒ − >
−
 
(3.7) rα π< −  
(3.7) is the first technical condition of the problem. Then, the constant k is given 
by: 
(3.8) 
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First, let’s look at the numerator: 
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Now, we will tackle the expectation term in the denominator. 
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Then, 
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   − + − + −   −   =  Q.E.D. 
Moreover, the assumption mode for the convergence of the indefinite 
integral in the derivation of k introduces the second technical condition.  
Lemma 1 provides the following condition for the integral in the 
derivation of k to converge. 
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As ρ should also be positive, the technical condition 2 could be written as: 
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Note that this condition is also known as ‘transversality condition’ as 
shown in Ingersoll (1987), p. 275. 
3. 4. Optimal Endowment Value 
 Using again the risk-neutral probability and the martingale property of the 
discounted (by the risk-free rate) processes under the risk-neutral probability 
defined by its Radon-Nikodym derivative. 
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where Zs-t is the Radon-Nikodym at date t of the change of probability at date s 
and Et is the conditional expectation at date t. This further implies the derivation 












− − −  = + −  − −   
 
The optimal endowment value is a constant, which could be interpreted as 
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We will apply the change of variable s s t′ = − . 
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This is the lognormal distribution of endowment value. After simplifying with 
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  Q.E.D. 
 
3. 5. Optimal Spending Rate 
 Define the spending rate, ty , to be the dollar amount consumed from the 
endowment at time t divided by the value of the endowment fund at time t. Under 
this definition of the spending rate, one could make the following observations 
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(3.11) 


































   + − + − + −   −   =
  + −  − −   
 
 At t=0, the initial spending rate, turns out to be greater than the spending 
rate used in the subsistence level of Yt: 
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 are both 
greater than zero from TC1 and TC2, respectively. Then, 0y α> , which means 
that one would start with an actual spending rate greater than the minimum level 
defined in tY . 
In addition, ty  is independent of the initial endowment value, V0. This 
property is linked to the assumption made about tY  and the assumed utility 











 will be increasing as well. This implies that as the stock prices go 
up, the spending rate should be decreased. On the other hand, a bearish 
environment could be particularly seen beneficial for the managers of 
foundations, which are obligated to spend at least 5% of their assets to operate 































under the tax-exempt status18. The rise in the ex-ante real rates of return during 
sustained bear markets helps fiduciaries of these institutions not to erode the 
principal value of donations, and at the same time, provide the required minimum 
spending level to beneficiaries. 
3. 6. Optimal Portfolio Strategy 
Define tx  to represent the proportion of market value of the portfolio 
allocated to the stock index. Then, the self-financing constraint could be written 
as follows: 
( )t t t t t
t
dV
r x r Y dt x dW
V
µ σ= + − − +    
We know from equation (3.2) that t t tdZ Z dWλ= − . In addition, from 
equation (3.10) we know that Vt is a function of t and Zt: ( ),t tV f t Z= . By 
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, which implies that for t “large 
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Note that the optimal portfolio strategy defined by the weight xt invested 
in the risky security is independent of the initial level of the endowment value, V0. 
This is a wealth-independence effect. Note also that 0r π α− − > , if St is 




γ  goes to zero (on most paths) at an exponential rate, leading to a 
constant weight (concave) strategy. If both St and t are increasing, xt increases at a 




= . Coincidentally, the maximum for the spending rate function happens as 
the portfolio strategy approaches the concave limit, indicating a decrease in the 
spending rate. 
                                                                                                                                                                       
18 Certain conclusions derived from the particular model used in this paper supports the 
arguments raised by Arnott and Bernstein (1997).  
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We can also show this in terms of dollar investments in stocks at t as 
defined by t t tX x V= : 
1
0 1t tX V Zr
γλ α
σγ π
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 will be increasing, 
implying an increase in tX , indicating a higher dollar allocation to stocks when 
the stock market is going up. In addition, when the risk aversion parameter rises 
(a more risk-averse endowment), the dollar amount invested in stocks declines.  
The resulting is a convex (momentum) strategy regarding the weights as well as 
dollar investments. In case of spending levels set at an exogenous resistance level, 
endowment funds should be managed in the spirit of the constant proportion 
portfolio insurance (CPPI) strategy due to Black and Perold (1992). 
The management of endowment funds is challenging due to the need for a 
balance between providing adequate and stable spending for current and future 
beneficiaries and the growth of the investment portfolio. By maximizing the 
expected utility function of the HARA type for the optimal spending stream under 
the self-financing constraint and the geometric Brownian motion assumption for 
the stock price process, the following conclusions have resulted: 
(i) The spending rate is independent of the initial endowment value. 
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(ii) For t “large enough”, a bullish market results in the spending rate 
being lowered as the strategy approaches a constant weight, so-
called ‘concave’, strategy. 
(iii) The optimal allocation to stocks Is not dependent on the initial 
endowment value, yielding the so-called ‘wealth-independence’ 
effect. 
(iv) As the stock price goes up, the allocation to stocks increases both 
in terms of weight and dollar amount. The optimal strategy, thus, 
could be called a momentum or convex strategy. 
(v) There is an inverse relationship between the stock index and 
optimal spending rate while the dollar spending value is positively 
related to the value of the stock index. 
3. 7. Simulation Results 
I use the following relationship between St and Zt to derive values of the 
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Simulating paths of Wt will allow one to obtain corresponding stock price 
process as well as Radon-Nikodym process. Given the following assumed values 
for the stock price process parameters; µ=12% and σ=20%, a value of –2 for the 
standard normal variate would provide a bearish path. In addition, I look at values 
of 0 and 2 for median and bullish paths, respectively19. Due to the positive drift in 
the stock price process, the median path also results in a bullish market 
environment. The other derived parameter value for the simulation experiment is 
the one associated with the risk aversion parameter. Assuming µ=12% and 
σ=20% as well as α=2%, π=2%, r=5%, γ should be around 0.97 for an 
endowment fund to have an initial allocation of 60% into stocks. Moreover, I set 
the time preference parameter for spending at 5%.  
Tables 1 through 3 show results in terms of spending rate, stock allocation 
and endowment value for a 30-year period for bullish, median and bearish paths, 
respectively. The chosen bullish path seems to be a very bullish environment 
since the stock weight approaches the constant weight limit of 180.4% {[(12%-
5%)/20%]÷(20%*0.97)} in almost 20 years. Despite the reluctance of endowment 
fund managers to use leverage in the management of the portfolio, the assumption 
of geometric Brownian motion along with a subsistence level requirement (in the 
spirit of habit formation) indicates otherwise. The spending rate reaches a limit of 
about 4.8% after the first 10-year period of the bullish path. Table 5 indicates that 
the average endowment annually spent between 4.7% and 4.9% of the portfolio 
                                                         
19 A constant value of the standard normal distributions defining the brownian motion 
generating the stock index is used for the purpose of these simple numerical simulations, 
which means that if tW n t= , n takes constant values equal to –2, 0 or 2. 
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value during the four years ending in 2000. The results do suggest that spending 
rate depends on the age of the endowment fund. 
 Long-term spending goals of large and small university endowment funds, 
as depicted in Table 4, have been reduced during the 1997-2000 period, whereas 
the medium-sized endowments did not post any significant changing behavior. 
The absolute changes are identical for larger and smaller endowments in the 
universe, whereas the medium-sized endowments do not change their long-term 
spending goals much during the same period. I further conjecture based on the 
findings in Table 4 that the significant drop witness in 1998 could be as a result of 
the incredible bull period and its psychological toll on endowment managers and 
trustees of the board. The analysis done by deMarche Associates shows that 
endowments should not have annual spending rates of 6% or more of the market 
value of the portfolio.  
Table 5 gives the distribution of the spending rate of endowments for 1997 
through 2000. The percentage of universities that has gone over this empirical 
limit stayed at 7% in 2000 after reaching a high of 11% in 1998. On the other 
hand, the percentage of universities that spent 3% or lower of the portfolio market 
value has more than doubled from a low of 6% in 1997 to a period-high of 13% in 
2000. Larger endowments have spent less over the period moving from a high of 
4.8% in 1997 to a low of 4.2% in 2000 (see Table 6). 
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Table 1: Simulation scenario - Bullish path 
Year Spending rate Stock allocation Endowment value 
(in millions) 
0 3.60% 60.14% 500 
1 4.03% 95.69% 689 
5 4.61% 144.33% 1,434 
10 4.82% 166.98% 3,317 
15 4.85% 175.12% 7,244 
20 4.85% 178.22% 15,040 
25 4.83% 179.46% 29,975 
30 4.82% 179.99% 57,833 
 
 
Table 2: Simulation scenario - Median path 
Year Spending rate Stock allocation Endowment value 
(in millions) 
0 3.60% 60.14% 500 
1 3.74% 63.93% 501 
5 4.27% 79.99% 515 
10 4.87% 100.90% 560 
15 5.32% 120.71% 642 
20 5.60% 137.67% 772 
25 5.73% 150.99% 965 




Table 3: Simulation scenario - Bearish path 
Year Spending rate Stock allocation Endowment value 
(in millions) 
0 3.60% 60.14% 500 
1 3.50% 37.98% 410 
5 3.98% 24.70% 332 
10 4.93% 20.69% 279 
15 6.18% 19.84% 239 
20 7.78% 20.44% 206 
25 9.78% 22.03% 179 
30 12.27% 24.48% 157 
 
 
 Table 4: Long-term spending goals by endowment size (1997 – 2000) 
 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 
Over $1 billion 4.8% 4.6% 4.7% 4.7% 
$250 million - 
$1 billion 4.7% 4.7% 4.6% 4.7% 
$250 million 
and under 4.9% 4.7% 4.8% 4.8% 
All 4.8% 4.7% 4.7% 4.8% 


































    Source: Greenwich Associates 
 
 

















  Source: Greenwich Associates 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 
1% 0% 1% 1% 0% 
2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
3% 5% 7% 7% 12% 
4.0-4.3% 19% 20% 22% 19% 
4.4-4.7% 14% 17% 21% 18% 
4.8-5.0% 30% 28% 21% 24% 
5.1-5.3% 9% 7% 8% 9% 
5.4-5.7% 11% 10% 9% 8% 
5.8-5.9% 2% 0% 2% 3% 
6% 6% 6% 2% 4% 
7% 1% 3% 6% 1% 
8% 2% 0% 0% 1% 
9% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
10% 0% 1% 0% 0% 
Over 10% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
     
Mean 4.9 4.8 4.8 4.7 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 
Over $1 billion 4.8% 4.5% 4.4% 4.2% 
$250 million - $1 
billion 4.8% 4.8% 4.7% 4.7% 
$250 million and 
under 5.1% 5.0% 5.0% 4.9% 
All 4.9% 4.8% 4.8% 4.7% 
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3. 8.  Sensitivity Analysis 
The effects of changing parameter values such as mean stock return, stock 
volatility, time-preference of spending and interest rates on the spending rate and 
stock allocation are analyzed in this section. The following table summarizes the 
range of values used for each parameter under five paths; i.e., n =-2, -1, 0, +1, +2, 
only the negative ones indicating a bearish path: 
 
µ 8%, 10%, 14%, 16% 
σ 16%, 18%, 22%, 24% 
ρ 1%, 3%, 7%, 9% 
r 4.5%, 5.5%, 6% 
 
 As could be seen in the Appendix, with the exception of the time-
preference parameter, any change in the remaining parameters led to the re-setting 
of the risk aversion parameter. This is necessary to set the initial stock and bond 
allocations at 60% and 40%, respectively. Moreover, in the case of the interest 
rate, the time preference parameter has to be used at 6%, instead of the base case 
of 5%. The resulting effects on the spending rate and stock allocation are 
summarized below with the simulation period covering 50 years: 
 Under very bullish (n = +2) and medium bullish (n = +1) states, only when 
µ is less than 10%, the relationship between spending rate and stock allocation 
ends up being inverse. In the slight bullish (n = 0) and medium bearish (n = -1) 
paths, they are positively related as µ is changes, all things being equal . Under 
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the very bearish (n = -2) scenario, on the other hand, the spending rate rises in a 
linear fashion to satisfy the subsistence level requirement embedded in the utility 
function, whereas the stock allocation follows a U-shaped pattern. The timing of 
the trough depends on the value of the stock return parameter, whereby the 8% 
case does not begin to rise even after 50 years. 
An increase in the volatility of the stock index results in a slightly inverse 
relationship between spending rate and stock allocation when the stock index 
process is assumed to follow a bullish path. Lower volatility and/or higher return 
of the stock process are required to have a positive relationship between spending 
and stock weight in the portfolio.  
In the bullish scenarios, as ρ falls below 5%, the (otherwise-direct) 
relationship between spending rate and stock allocation becomes significantly 
inverse. Under bearish states, the spending rate goes up as time increases, whereas 
the stock allocation drops initially the first 5 to 10 years, then increases 
significantly. 
 When the interest rate parameter takes on the value of 4.5%, the resulting 
relationship could not be generalized in any scenario. In all other cases, the 
positive relationship between the spending rate and stock allocation is insensitive 
to the changes in r. Higher values of r result in a positive relationship. 
3. 9. Conclusion 
 The management of endowment funds is challenging due to the need to 
find a balance between providing adequate and stable spending for beneficiaries 
and growth of the portfolio. By maximizing the expected utility function of the 
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HARA type for the optimal spending stream under the self-financing constraint 
and the geometric Brownian motion assumption for the stock price process, the 
spending rate is independent of the initial endowment value. Moreover, for t 
“large enough”, a bullish market results in the spending rate being lowered as the 
strategy approaches a constant weight strategy. 
 The optimal portfolio allocation to stocks is not dependent on the initial 
endowment value, yielding the so-called wealth-independence effect. As the stock 
price goes up, the allocation to stocks increases both in terms of weight and dollar 
amount. The optimal strategy can then be classified as a clear momentum or 
convex strategy. With regard to the optimal spending rate, we find an inverse 
relation between the stock index and the optimal spending rate while the dollar 
spending value is positively related to the value of the stock index. 
 In a probability-maximizing framework, Browne (1999) postulates that 
extensive use of leveraging could be risk-reducing when there is no finite deadline 
or when the investor has an external source of income. Thus, it is imperative to 
include a stochastic model for the donation stream when deriving intertemporal 
solutions for university endowments. Moreover, additional donations would lower 
management fees as well as provide an opportunity to invest in more successful 
money management firms. Certain economies of scale result from the growth of 
the endowment portfolio that could be a crucial determinant in the allocation and 
spending of endowment funds. 
The sharing of the realized endowment portfolio value in terms of annual 
spending to beneficiaries at various colleges and departments of a particular 
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university is typically done in a linear fashion on a pro rata basis. Similar 
restrictions are forced upon the member’s payoff profile in pension funds and 
participating life insurance contracts. Linear sharing rules are Pareto optimal as 
long as the degrees of relative risk aversion of academic units are identical in the 
case of CRRA utility functions. Nevertheless, I would argue that beneficiaries of 
university endowment pools have CRRA utility functions with different degrees 
of relative risk aversion or even completely different utility functions that might 
include parameters to satisfy the aversion of participants toward loss or 
disappointment. The apparent heterogeneity among beneficiaries of the 
endowment pool could be attributed to the following facts: 
(i) Different degrees of relative risk aversion 
(ii) Different forms of utility functions 
(iii) Dispersion among portfolio values due to differences in fund-
raising success 
(iv) Different intertemporal rate of substitution 
Given the fact that total dollars available for spending are distributed on a 
pro rata basis, the management of the endowment portfolio by the Treasurer or 
CFO of the foundation (in line with preferences of board members) induces utility 
losses for particular members of the pool. In this setting, the endowment fund 
manager ends up investing in the same manner as would an investor with some 
CRRA utility function with a relative risk aversion parameter that is different 
from that of the college or academic unit under consideration. Moreover, the 
minimum spending rate policy to provide a guaranteed allocation is considered to 
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be a useful practice for it makes the budgetary planning more predictable. In 
particular, if an account is dedicated to support the salary of a faculty member in 
the form of a chair or professorship, such rules make it possible to hire and keep 
excellent educators at colleges and universities. 
One should analyze the effects of the suboptimal asset allocation that is a 
result of the utility loss, which is a function of the difference between the level of 
relative risk aversion of a college and the one used by the endowment fund 
manager to derive the investment policy for the endowed portfolio. Some colleges 
are more aggressive than others when it comes to aversion to risk or to various 
behavioral factors, and the compromise between preferences made by the fund 
manager results in utility loss for members of the endowment pool. Another issue 
surrounding the suboptimal management of endowment funds arises from the fact 
that certain colleges would like to spend more today than tomorrow. The stock 
market rally witnessed during the 90s helped those who favor increased spending 
in the short-term over the growth of the corpus for long-term purposes to make a 
case for the distribution of the unrealized gains to academic units. Proponents of 
this view might aim at investing in the infrastructure of the college and 
development efforts.  
From the standpoint of increasing the productivity and the attractiveness 
of a given college, it could be argued that putting more dollars back into the 
college might yield more return over the long-run than relying on the endowment 
fund manager. On the other hand, other colleges that do not need immediate 
resources for the expansion of the academic programs would be perfectly fine 
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with spending less today. I would a priori postulate that compromising between 
preferences among colleges would eventually lead to suboptimal asset allocation 
and spending decisions. When there is a minimum spending rate guarantee in 
place, colleges with high levels of relative risk aversion are compensated partly 
for the loss induced by an aggressive investment policy, whereas others with a 
low level of relative risk aversion are suffering a further utility loss relative to the 
loss induced by a conservative investment policy. 
In the previous section, I have eluded into the fact that the desire of some 
endowment pool  participants to capture a serious portion of the excess return on 
an annual basis might create long-lasting internal conflicts of interest between the 
managers of the fund and the beneficiaries. To minimize the tension between 
various parties involved in the management of university endowments, a surplus 
distribution mechanism similar to the ones used in many life insurance products 
could provide a creative way to better manage endowment funds. Moreover, the 
effective combination of minimum spending rates and the sharing of the positive 
excess return might yield a fair distribution of available funds to the colleges and 
academic units. I realize the significance of the learning curve necessary to 
achieve these drastic changes, but the simple fact that universities are complex 
entities only justifies the development of more efficient structures. 
It would not be prudent to distribute a large portion of the excess return for 
it acts as a buffer during prolonged bear markets. The minimum spending rate 
requirement as outlined in the investment policy of the endowment portfolio falls 
into the category of annual/multi-period return guarantees, whereby the 
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endowment promises to yield a certain rate of return to the beneficiaries on an 
annual basis. Colleges could use the surplus (or excess return) distribution 
mechanism to increase the level of spending in a given year for the benefit of the 
faculty and student body. At other times when the stock market is not able to 
cover the minimum spending rate and the purchasing power, there might be a 
need to tap into the surplus account. The decentralization of certain functions of 
endowment fund management could eliminate some problems and eventually lead 
to more effectively managed institutions of higher learning. The portion of the 
excess return that is reinvested back into the endowment portfolio is vital to 
capitalize on the compounding principle as well as to lower external fees paid to 
outside portfolio managers. The similarities between this mechanism and the one 
used by some life insurance products of the participating nature end with the 
notion that there are no contract maturities as far as endowments are concerned. 
Colleges that do not use their portion of the excess return during good years 
would find it cost effective to replace the computers used by the faculty and the 
students at times when most technology companies are losing value in the stock 
market. These companies typically offer significant discounts during bad times to 
boost revenue streams. If there is no discretion given to individual academic units, 
one could question the efficiency of the system from a holistic point of view. Risk 
and return sharing arrangements could be established between the endowment 
fund and the colleges as well as among colleges. 
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Chapter 4 
Currency Hedging for International Portfolios 
 
4. 1. Introduction 
During the last decade we have witnessed a serious attempt by many 
investment management firms to push an allocation by institutional investors into 
alternative investments.  To some, the complexity of non-traditional investment 
strategies by far outweighs the theoretical justification in the risk/return 
dimension, which is mainly due to their low correlations with traditional asset 
classes such as global stocks and bonds, resulting in more efficient financial 
structures.  In the mean time, due to the perpetual nature of endowments, 
fiduciaries of university foundations with large asset sizes have been more 
responsive to the notion of diversifying the broad asset classes with such 
alternative investments as private equity, hedge funds, and real estate, just to 
name a few.  
 The recent downward spiral of financial markets and the apparent slowing 
of the U.S. economy hurt portfolios that are heavily exposed to the systematic risk 
of domestic stocks.  The technology sector was hit the hardest because of the 
incredible overvaluations witnessed in stocks of tech companies.   Some 
investment professionals as well as serious thinkers in the financial industry 
embraced the idea of a completely new economic structure for the U.S.   There 
was not one day in 2000 when investors did not hear a conversation about the 
differences between the “New Economy’ and ‘Old Economy’ stocks, and 
implications for portfolio management.  Over the last year, we all rediscovered 
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painfully that the business ‘cycle’ is still alive, and more importantly, 
diversification into various asset classes is crucial to smoothing out these tough 
rides of the recent past.  
Strategic asset allocation and asset liability modeling are believed to 
provide the most value added to institutional portfolios. Brinson, Hood and 
Beebower (1986) are the first to provide evidence of the importance of asset 
allocation decision in the overall institutional fund management process. The 
selection of asset classes in the initial phase of constructing an efficient portfolio 
becomes crucial to achieving long-term goals of pension plans. Moreover, since 
the remaining pieces of the puzzle flow directly from the initial analysis, we 
cannot say enough about the challenges the investment management and 
consulting community face in terms of definitions and purposes of asset class 
categories, and assumptions about distributional characteristics of each. The 
impact of changing economic conditions as well as the introduction of new asset 
categories on modeling assumptions needs to be monitored continuously, and 
appropriate methodologies and techniques should be implemented in response to 
these developments to keep the asset allocation as efficient and prudent as 
possible. Any asset allocation exercise that fails to dynamically model the 
interaction of assets both public and private and liabilities such as the spending 
requirements is unlikely to produce solutions where risk, return, benefit security 
and cost are balanced most appropriately. 
 The return in an active global portfolio comes from three sources: 
individual security selection, country/region bets, and (embedded) currency 
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exposure. Many institutional investors have not been giving the necessary 
attention to the effects of foreign exchange movements on the overall portfolio.  
Others, usually very large institutional investors with a high allocation into 
international investments, have realized the relevance of currency hedging on the 
overall fund management process. Over the years, different approaches have been 
utilized to address the issue within the guidelines of the investment policy to 
make the ‘embedded’ currency gain/loss an explicit part of the portfolio 
management process.  Some endowment fund managers did not like the fact that 
currencies, in the long-term, do not provide an ex-ante return, but increase the 
volatility of the total portfolio. This thought process resulted in the creation of the 
‘risk-controlled’ currency overlay product, which attracted a great deal of interest 
from volatility-sensitive institutional investors in the late 80s. Since then, 
currency managers and investors have discovered the value-added potential of 
active currency management due to the widely published inefficiencies that are 
very unique to the foreign exchange markets and expected to stay for the years to 
come. Through the end of 2000, the unhedged mandates in U.S. dollar-based 
accounts produced the following one-, three-, and five-year information ratios20, 
0.56, 0.47, and 0.69, respectively. Annualized information ratios for the 50% 
hedged composite, the currency managers, on average, report 0.26, 0.23 and 0.46 
for the respective time periods. The average annualized information ratios, which 
are computed using a time-weighted scheme since the inception of each account, 
are 0.82 and 0.60 for the unhedged and 50% hedged benchmarks, respectively.  I 
                                                         
20 Information ratio is defined as the ratio of the excess return over a pre-determined 
benchmark divided by its standard deviation, which is called the tracking error. 
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would argue that the discrepancy between the information ratios of unhedged and 
50% hedged benchmarks could be due to the forward rate premium bias, first 
reported by Fama (1984) and then made popular by Kritzman (1993a), that is 
widely utilized by currency overlay managers. For a U.S. institutional investor in 
an EAFE mandate, hedging more of the low-interest rate currency exposure; i.e., 
the U.S. dollar, would result in the unhedged mandates outperforming the 50% 
hedged counterparts as far as risk-adjusted excess returns are concerned. Given 
the nature of global financial markets, the ability of most currency managers 
generating excess returns, and risk preferences of many institutional investors 
including factors related to governance budgets, the two-step procedure of 
selecting securities and countries/regions first, and then letting an overlay expert 
handle the currency exposure from both a risk-controlling and alpha generation 
perspective seems to be a more viable route for pension plans21.  
 The asymmetric nature of the polar benchmarks limits the long and short 
capabilities of active currency managers, who argue that having a symmetrical 
mandate would benefit the investor a great deal due to the expansion of the 
opportunity set in the long-term.   The fundamental law of active management22 
provides a framework to understand why an expanded opportunity set; i.e., larger 
breadth, would translate into immediate increase in the information ratios for 
                                                         
21 See Grinold and Meese (2000b) for a different point of view. I would argue that, given 
the points raised in this article and the fact that one uses the same kind of risk aversion as 
the one used to derive the optimal portfolio in an asset allocation or Asset Liability 
Management (ALM) framework, the two-step procedure would yield close-to optimal 
and fairly sensible solutions for the problem at hand. 
 
22 See Grinold and Kahn (2000a) for details of the concept. 
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overlay managers, ceteris paribus, because of the constant skill level23.  In polar 
benchmarks such as unhedged and fully hedged, the base currency’s movements 
have a large impact on the excess return generation potential of the currency 
manager, assuming there is no short sale allowed on the base currency.  
Moreover, the argument for an unhedged benchmark using a diversified currency 
basket does not translate into the smoothing of currency fluctuations due to high 
return correlations between major currencies both in strong- and weak-dollar 
economic environments. Black (1990), in a fairly provocative article, argued that 
a portion of foreign equity investments should be permanently unhedged, which is 
basically postulating that one should take a buy-and-hold position in currency 
with a fraction of the capital. 
 The purpose of this chapter is to review some of the currency arithmetic 
from an optimal hedge ratio perspective as well as provide interesting insights in 
the use of different risk preferences for asset and currency volatilities as well as 
their interactions.  I propose the incorporation of a risk aversion parameter for the 
covariability of asset and currency positions. The point is that one should be able 
to understand the contribution of an active position to worsening or improving the 
benchmark risk properties. The use of this extra risk aversion parameter might 
help currency overlay managers derive more meaningful and profitable hedge 
ratios that are used for the management of the foreign exchange exposures in 
institutional portfolios. Furthermore, one could make the argument that the 
                                                         
23 For other styles of portfolio management, increasing the breadth of the portfolio may 
not translate into immediate increase in information ratios due to the problems of keeping 
the skill level constant. 
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traditional performance measures including the information ratio are not 
incorporating this notion in the ranking of active portfolio managers. The skill in 
choosing the optimal bet size by any active portfolio manager; i.e., the magnitude 
of the active positions around the benchmark; would be captured effectively via 
the proposed methodology. 
 The chapter discusses the case for an endowment fund, which views the 
(embedded) currency exposure of the international assets in the portfolio as an 
opportunity to generate additional excess returns while reducing the risk of 
significant cash outflows that could result from settling forward contracts with a 
loss. I will follow the general procedure of balancing a particular hedging 
strategy’s effects on the portfolio’s expected risk/return profile. The process of 
effective hedge ratio management entails the combination of expected utility 
maximization with a comprehensive view as it pertains to the strength or 
weakness of the U.S. dollar vis-à-vis other currencies used by portfolio managers 
of foreign assets. 
4. 2. Framework 
I will analyze the effects of dual optimization in a portfolio of 
international assets. Let , ,H FA fr r r  represent the rates of return on the hedged 
foreign assets, unhedged foreign assets (in US dollars), and the forward contract, 
respectively.  Note that FAr  could be further broken down into two components: 
the return on the foreign asset in local terms, Lr , and the currency return, Cr , via 
FA L Cr r r= + . The significance of this relationship could be seen when the analyst 
uses the variance of foreign asset returns in local terms as opposed to US dollar 
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terms in an efficient frontier analysis to justify the allocation into international 
investments. The variance of the foreign asset returns in local terms comes out to 
be less than the variance of returns in US dollars terms, unless the covariance of 
returns in local terms with the embedded currency returns is highly negative.  This 
could easily be witnessed if one looks at the variance equation of FAr . W stands 
for the weighting of the forward contract; i.e., the hedge ratio.  The relationship 
between them can be explained via the following equation: 
(4.1) H FA fr r r W= +  
The variability of returns on the hedged foreign assets could be given as 
follows: 
( ) ( ) 2H FA f HVar r Var r r W σ= + =  
(4.2) 2 2 2 2 ,2H FA f FA f FA fW Wσ σ σ σ σ ρ= + +  
Then, the minimum variance (or risk minimizing) hedge ratio, MVW , 





f F A f F A fWW
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= − = −  
One can conclude that MVW will be different from zero in all cases unless 
the foreign asset’s return in dollar terms and the forward return are near to being 
uncorrelated, , 0FA fρ ≈ , which makes a strong case for an hedged position even 
for a risk minimizing investor.  In order to evaluate the statistical properties of the 
risk minimizing hedge ratio, one could run a simple regression, FA fr rα β ε= + + , 
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and perform hypothesis tests on the estimates of beta.  Moreover, the values of the 
coefficient of determination, 
22
,FA fR ρ =   , from the estimated equation would 
gauge the effectiveness of the model, and hence, the ex-post validity of the 
derived risk minimizing hedge ratio24.   
Positive (negative) values of ,FA fρ  result in MVW  being less (greater) than 
zero. Positive MVW indicates shorting the U.S. dollar, which is not allowed in 
almost all overlay accounts.  On the other hand, negative values represent various 
levels of hedging activity with the extreme case of –1 indicating full hedging back 
to the U.S. dollar, given the total portfolio is international. 
Different levels of risk aversion and cost of hedging would (and should) 
affect the amount of hedging employed by the overlay manager.  If we let Hµ  
represent the return on hedged foreign assets and λ  the level of risk aversion, 
then the expected utility derived from currency hedging could be described as 
follows: 
(4.4) 2( ) H HE U µ λσ= −  
The return on hedged foreign assets could be written as: 
( )( )1H f L f C L
f L f C C L L
f C f C L
W c W
W W Wc W W
W c
µ µ µ µ µ
µ µ µ µ µ µ
µ µ µ µ
 = + − + − + 
= + − + − + −
 = − − + + 
 
where 
                                                         
24 Note that low values of R-squared might be coupled with high hedge ratios in case 
when FA fσ σ>> .  In these cases, the t-statistic of the estimated beta should be evaluated 
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Lµ … local return   
fc … transaction cost (bid-ask spread, which is approximately 5 basis points in 
currencies of developed countries) 
When W=0, indicating no hedging, H C Lµ µ µ= + . That is, the expected 
return on foreign assets becomes the sum of the currency return and local return.  
When W=1, indicating full hedging, H f L fcµ µ µ= + − .  It becomes the sum of 
forward return and local return after subtracting the cost of the bid-ask spread in 
the particular foreign exchange pair.   
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The utility maximizing hedge ratio will not be too different from the 
minimum variance ratio as long as the risk aversion parameter and the volatility in 
the currency markets are significantly high. Suppose the minimum variance hedge 
ratio comes out to be –0.8. That is, 0.8MVW = − , indicating a hedge ratio of 80%, 
which implies the sale of the forward contract in an amount equal to 80% of the 
value of the underlying portfolio. This is by itself a significant bet both in a 50% 
hedged and, particularly, an unhedged benchmark, which the currency overlay 
manager is hired to beat by being on the right side of the currency movements. 










=  to represent the part of the optimal 
hedge ratio that includes risk preferences of the investor as well as the cost of 
hedging.  Then, 
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(4.7) UMV U MVW W W= +  
UW  will be less than zero, indicating some level of hedging of the foreign 
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In other words, when this period’s forward rate is less than the next 
period’s expected spot rate, 0 1F S< , indicating that 0F  underestimates the level of 
depreciation or overestimates the level of appreciation, UW  will be negative. For 
instance, if one believes the current forward rate is underestimating the level of 
depreciation or overestimating the level of appreciation in the Japanese yen 
against the U.S. dollar, she would sell the yen forward contract, and thus, increase 
the level of hedging. In this specific case, whatever value the risk aversion 
parameter or volatility of the forward contract takes on, the optimal hedge ratio, 
UMVW , ends up being greater than the risk minimizing hedge ratio.  It takes the 
portfolio manager farther away from an unhedged benchmark position, whereas 
the effect in a 50% hedged mandate depends on the level of MVW
25. 
                                                         
25 When 0.5MVW < − , e.g., 0.6MVW = − , UMVW  takes the hedge position farther from the 
50% hedged benchmark. On the other hand, 0.5MVW > − , e.g., 0.4MVW = − , one gets 
closer to the symmetrical mandate position, resulting in smaller tracking error. 
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In addition, if the investor is more risk averse or the volatility of the 
forward contract is high, the currency manager is inclined to hedge even more 
from a utility maximization perspective.  This theoretical result would be hard to 
justify in an unhedged mandate if there is a high probability (strong belief) that 
the U.S. dollar will depreciate in the next period.  There should be a platform for 
the inclusion of probability statements about the strength of the dollar derived 
from the information set up to time t-1 that includes fundamental as well as 
technical factors.  This would enable the currency manager to adjust (update) the 
expected utility maximizing hedge ratio in a Bayesian context. For instance, it 
would be interesting to include a prior distribution on the hedge ratio that reflects 
the knowledge regarding the strength of the dollar. Ideally, depending on the 
specific expectations in the foreign exchange markets, the prior could take the 
form of a uniform distribution. 
 Originally, λ  is defined as the risk aversion with respect to the variability 
in hedged asset return, which includes the return on unhedged foreign asset as 
well as the return on the forward contract.  One might argue that the risk aversion 
parameter for the variability of the unhedged foreign asset, 2FAσ , should be 
different than the risk aversion parameter for the variability of the forward 
contract, 2fσ . In the above analysis, one implicit assumption is that the risk 
aversion parameter is the same for both types of risks. Within the context of 
portfolio construction, the risk aversion parameter is defined to balance the trade-
off between risk reduction and return enhancement. It simply measures how many 
units of expected return one is willing to give up for each unit reduction in the 
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variability of the return series.  The assumption of equal risk aversion for foreign 
asset return volatility and forward contract return volatility does not seem 
reasonable due to different perceptions of risk that are due to differences in 
incentive structures of currency ovarlay managers and international equity 
managers. Despite the fact that agency problems might lead to irrational decision-
making on the part of the endowment manager, my objective is to provide a 
framework that captures the inherent asymmetric nature of managerial incentives 
utilized in the management of international portfolios with active currency 
hedging component attached as a separate mandate. 
 Chow (1995) introduced the notion of mean-variance-tracking error 
(MVTE) optimization, which maximizes an objective function that includes 
different parameter values for absolute and relative risk aversion. He basically 
extended the objective function of [Expected Return – Risk Aversion x Risk] to 
include the tracking error, which is the standard deviation of relative return with 
respect to a benchmark.  In his optimization algorithm, the objective function 
takes the form [Expected Return – Risk Aversion x Risk – Tracking Aversion x 
Tracking Error2], which produces an efficient surface in three dimensions.  The 
only way in which the dimensional expansion of the efficient frontier would fail 
to improve upon a constrained mean-variance optimization due to Markowitz 
(1952) is if the investor knew in advance what constraints were optimal. This 
ironically becomes the solution of the three-dimensional problem. There is also a 
behavioral argument to be made about the MVTE optimization, which takes care 
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of two simultaneous fears of investors, namely being wrong (absolute 
performance) and alone (relative performance).  
 My belief is that within the context of active currency management and 
expected utility maximization, 2FAσ  could be viewed as the asset volatility 
estimator and 2fσ  as the currency volatility estimator; i.e., the tracking error. 
Moreover, one could actually incorporate different risk aversion parameters for 
absolute and relative volatilities instead of imposing ad hoc constraints in the 
optimization process.  To this end, I will define aλ and cλ to represent the asset 
and currency risk aversion parameters, respectively. At this point, I would like to 
come back to the previous discussion of using a framework that would use 
additional information about the strength of the dollar in the setting I am 
proposing. If we suppose that additional information gathered through analysis of 
patterns in the price charts of various currencies leads to a strong dollar in a 
trending environment, a position near an unhedged benchmark would jeopardize 
the success of the overlay program. The overall risk would be very high, whereas 
the risk measured against devations from the benchmark position; i.e., tracking 
error, would be non-existing. In technical terms, if a manager puts a larger 
weighting on the asset risk parameter versus the currency counterpart in  an 
unhedged mandate; i.e., a cλ λ< , the strength of the dollar would result in 
unacceptable performance in the absolute dollars generated by the currency 
overlay program. The extended utility maximization framework helps the 
endowment fund manager incorporate the additional information on the dollar by 
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assuming a cλ λ>> , which would, in return, increase the financial efficiency of 
the overall portfolio. 
 If we relax the assumption that , 0FA fρ = , we could introduce mλ  as the 
risk aversion parameter for the covariability of foreign asset and currency returns. 
The use of a different aversion parameter for the covariance in the expected utility 
framework could be justified in terms of completely different dynamics of asset 
versus currency markets as well as the descriptive nature of the approach used 
here whereby certain irrationalities could be modeled more effectively. The 
assumption of one common risk aversion parameter for both markets and their 
interaction could yield misleading hedging decisions. In this setting, the following 
optimal hedge ratio would result: 
(4.8) *
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= +  Q.E.D. 
 One could argue that c mλ λ> in many cases due to the fact that currency 
managers are regret minimizers with the objective of not being farther away from 
the benchmark as well as concerns regarding the possibility of large cash outflows 
at times of forward contract settlements. In most cases, this behavior is a by-
product of the attitude of institutional investors toward currency overlay as a fund 
management vehicle.  Please note that I am not using the term ‘as an investment 
management vehicle’, because active currency hedging programs in the traditional 
sense do not require additional investments by the endowment fund unless there is 
an explicit intent to use them as portable alpha engines26 as part of the absolute 
return part of the portfolio. Given any risk aversion parameter for currency 
volatility, the argument results in an optimal hedge ratio that is lower than the 
hedge ratio, which is computed without mλ . That is, 
*






> → < .  
                                                         
26 Kritzman (1993b), in the context of a risk-minimizing investor, shows that one should 
hedge the currency risk of investment portfolios even if they contain no foreign assets.  
This illustrates the importance of the currency as an asset class and a significant 
component of the risk/return profile. 
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 Qualitatively, the implication of this result is that assigning different risk 
aversion parameters for the foreign asset variance and currency variance in the 
expected utility framework along with the hesitancy toward taking too much bets 
in the currency markets results in lower hedge ratios, ceteris paribus. In addition, 
the asymetric nature of  currency overlay manager’s incentive structure 
encourages aggressive active management of hedge ratios with the belief that 
higher volatility would result in better compensation for the manager.  
4. 3. Active Currency Hedging for a Disappointment-Averse Investor 
 Proponents of the fairly new, but rapidly evolving, field of behavioral 
finance postulate that portfolio selection, with or without international assets, is 
much more complicated than simply making a choice from the efficient frontier 
that optimally balances expected return against volatility as measured by the 
standard deviation of returns. The expected utility maximization framework 
utilized in the previous section for the computation of optimal hedge ratios 
consider behavioral aspects of decision-making by board members of university 
endowment funds. I had motivated the use of different risk aversion parameters 
for asset and currency volatilities in terms of differences in the managerial 
incentives for asset and currency managers as well as agency problems that I had 
phrased as ‘governance issues.’ It is a well-known fact that people are guided by 
emotions, which often reflect a certain kind of benchmarking in the process. 
Benchmarks could take various forms, for instance, an explicit one could be the 
performance of a particular index or a more implicit one is the problem-specific 
reference point/subsistence level used to measure gains or losses. Many scholars 
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from economics and psychology studied the manner in which regret influences 
decisions and people’s emotional disposition. Regret could be defined as the pain 
relative to not having taken a better action, whereas disappointment is the pain 
from comparing the actual outcome with a better one. In other words, regret 
captures the difference between the performance of the selected portfolio and the 
performance of any other foregone portfolio; whereas disappointment captures the 
discrepancy between actual and expected performance. 
 Shefrin (2000) presents an example from financial markets that would 
help us differentiate these closely related concepts, both of which is based on the 
act of comparison: It was late July of 1998 when financial markets were jittery 
about economic problems in Asia and the market had just fallen by 20 percent. 
Imagine a conversation between you and two of your friends, George and Paul. 
George had a lot of his portfolio in stocks and was fretting about a severe market 
decline. In the end, he decided to sell his stocks and buy CDs instead. Paul, 
instead, had been holding CDs which had just matured. He thought that the 
market would rebound and considered buying mutual fund shares. However, he 
renewed his CDs. Thereafter, the market appreciated by over 25 per cent. Both 
investors held CD portfolios during this period. Both would have been better off 
by holding stocks. The question is; which one feels worse about the situation? 
Most people would say George is not only disappointed about the outcome but 
also experiences regret stemming from the action he took. So, he seems to be 
worse off emotionally. Interestingly, this example proves the point that behavioral 
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aspects are typically path-dependent, meaning where you start, what you think 
and when all lead to distinct emotions at the end. 
 Regret and disappointment are important factors when it comes managing 
investment portfolios that are connected to a certain kind of benchmarking 
mechanism. We could say that comparison is the psychological basis for 
benchmarking. I agree with Shefrin that people are hard-wired to engage in 
comparison, and measure themselves against some benchmark. I would further 
argue that the challenge becomes how to come up with the most relevant 
benchmark in any given situation so that whatever actions we might take would 
not result in regret and disappointment. Those who are fearful of experiencing 
regret may fear taking an action that will leave them vulnerable to regret. 
 People are especially prone to feeling the regret of a decision that turned 
out badly when they feel responsible for that decision. Institutional investors such 
as pension plans and endowments transfer responsibility when they engage the 
services of money managers. In addition to transferring the responsibility of 
managing the funds at the institutions, board members hire consultants for advice 
on which money managers to choose for the institutional portfolio. It could be 
conjectured that trustees at various pension funds and endowments create a 
psychological option for themselves by taking these actions on behalf of the 
institution for which they serve as fiduciaries. When the portfolios perform well, 
they can take the credit, otherwise, they can shift the blame to the money 
managers and consultants. Very recently, Unilever (U.K.) even sued Merrill 
Lynch Asset Management for negligence and reportedly settled the case outside 
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the court system at the expense of the money management firm. So, we started 
witnessing legal actions against money managers that perform below par for not 
having adhered to the guidelines set forth by the client. There is also one more 
reason why institutions find the (partial) transfer of responsibility appealing: 
cognitive limitations. I would argue that some fiduciaries are unable to 
differentiate between payoff-irrelevant information (also called ‘noise’) and 
payoff-relevant information, mostly due to cognitive biases in processing 
information. Lastly, the fact that investors have the tendency to evaluate gains and 
losses frequently leads to second-guessing exercises and attempting to resolve the 
regret and disappointment issue. 
 Here, I will concentrate on the disappointment aversion framework, 
introduced by Gul (1991)27, and investigate the optimal hedging behavior for a 
disappointment-averse hedger. Unlike the notion of risk aversion, feelings of 
disappointment violate the separability axioms that impose that preferences are 
independent across states; that is, outcomes in events that did not occur affect 
attitudes towards outcomes that did. Regret, on the other hand, involves 
comparing outcomes in a given event with those that would have occurred in the 
same event had the agent chosen a different act or lottery or portfolio for that 
matter. Disappointment involves comparing outcomes from different events in the 
same act or lottery. In principle, one could be disappointed without ever having 
choices to make. The preferences will be a one parameter extension of standard 
                                                         
27 Grant and Kajii (1998) and Skiadas (1997) provided two other notions of 
disappointment aversion. Grant et al. (2001) demonstrate how different formalizations 
lead to different notions of disappointment aversion by comparing the models of Gul, 
Grant & Kajii, and Skiadas. 
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iso-elastic preferences in the usual expected utility framework. They have the 
characteristic that good outcomes that are above the certainty equivalent are 
downweighted relative to bad outcomes. The use of disappointment averse 
preferences is particularly beneficial in the case of currency hedging due to the 
complexity of the issue and resulting behavioral concerns of fiduciaries. It is 
shown that disappointment aversion utility displays first order risk aversion, 
where the risk premium is proportional to standard deviation, as opposed to 
variance in the case of expected utility. This feature helps one to account for the 
phenomenon that individuals are risk averse with respect to gambles which yield a 
large loss with small probability (as in the stock market) but risk loving with 
respect to gambles that involve winning a large prize with small probability (as in 
lottery gambles). 
 Both disappointment aversion and loss aversion, according to the prospect 
theory of Kahneman and Tversly (1979), define the utility function 
asymmetrically over gains and losses relative to a reference point. For a loss-
aversion utility function, the reference point is arbitrarily exogenously chosen, 
whereas disappointment-averse utility function determines the reference point 
endogenously that could be updated over time. The second appealing aspect of 
this kind of framework is that it is fully axiomatic and provides a normative 
theory, eliminating the need for ad hoc techniques witnessed in the descriptive 
theoretical frameworks. Lastly, the fact that standard preferences are a special 
case of disappointment averse preferences with the loss aversion parameter put 
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equal to one. Thus, one could capture many of the asymmetric affects of loss 
aversion without resorting to behavioral theory28. 
 The preferences of a disappointment averse agent could be summarized by 
[ ]( ),U R β , where U is a conventional utility function describing the utility of 
earning the rate of return R from a given investment, and 0β ≥  is a parameter 
that measures the degree of disappointment aversion. In the absence of 
disappointment aversion, the agent’s utility level is simply [ ]( )U R . Now, I will 
define the expected utility of a disappointment-averse agent as ( )V β  with β  
representing the degree of disappointment aversion. Suppose that the agent faces 
uncertain rates of return, R, in n states of nature. Let µ  denote the certain return 
that yields the same utility level as the uncertain return: ( ) ( )V Uβ µ= . This 
means, the investor is indifferent between the prospect of a safe return and risky 
return in n states of nature. The agent reveals disappointment aversion if she 
attaches extra disutility to circumstances  where the realized return is below µ .  
The disappointment-averse utility function could be defined as: 
[ ] [ ]( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) |V E U R E U U R Rβ β µ µ= − − <  
[ ]( ) ( ) |E U U R Rµ µ− <  is the expected value of ( ) ( )U U Rµ − , conditional on 
the realized return being below the certainty equivalent return. In other words, the 
term [ ]( ) ( ) |E U U R Rµ µ− <  measures the average disappointment. It is the 
expected discrepancy  between the certainty equivalence utility and the actual 
                                                         
28 A different treatment of an investor’s asymmetric response to gains and losses is given 
by Roy (1952), Browne (1999), Stutzer (2000), and Maenhout (2001), who model agents 
with the objective of minimizing the possibility of undesirable outcomes. 
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utility in states of nature where the realized return is below the certainty-
equivalent return. Basically, the disappointment-averse expected utility equals the 
conventional expected utility, adjusted downwards by a measure of 
disappointment aversion, β , times the “conditional expected disappointment.” 
 I will now define two states of nature, whereby the agent earns the return 
R in state 1 or 2, and 1 2R R>  with probabilities ( ),1α α− , respectively. Now, we 
are in a position to redefine ( )V β : 
[ ]1 2 2( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )V U R U R V U Rβ α α β α β= + − − − −  
Further rearranging of the terms helps separate the utilities of earning 1R  and 2R : 









 If the agent is disappointment-averse, that is 0β > , he attaches extra 
weight ( )1 α αδ− to bad states; i.e., in the case of 2R , when is disappointed 
(relative to the probability weight used in the conventional utility), and attaches a 
lesser weight ( )1α α δ− −  to good states. Note that when 0β = , V(.) simplifies 
to the conventional expected utility. 
 I will define 1R  and 2R as follows: 
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 and 11 12S S< . Stated differently, in the 
case of an international portfolio, the good state refers to the spot currency rate 
being smaller than the one in the bad state. This refers to the fact that a smaller 
spot rate indicates appreciation of the foreign currency against the U.S. dollar, 
providing higher return on invested capital due to currency movements. All the 
remaining variables are as defined before. 
 The objective is to find an optimal hedging behavior by maximizing the 
disappointment-averse utility function, V(β). On taking partial derivative with 
respect to W, we have 
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The optimal forward position should equate the following two terms in the above 
equation:
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )1 1 2 21 1 ( ) 1 1 ( )f c f f c fU R c U R cα α δ µ µ α αδ µ µ′ ′− − − − = − − + − −    
If we assign the same probability to states 1 and 2, this relationship could be 
simplified further. Given the fact that ( )1α α= − ; 
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When α  increases, the RHS increases more than the LHS. As a result, 
1( )U R′  must increase to restore the equality. That is, 1R  must decrease, or 
equivalently, *W  must decrease. In other words, an increase in the probability of 
the good state occurring reduces the optimal forward position, which is an 
intuitive conclusion based on the definition of the good state. That is, the higher 
the probability of the foreign currency appreciating , the less likely it is to hedge 
these currency positions. In other words, the endowment benefit more by not 
hedging any significant portion of the foreign exchange exposure.  








. As the hedger becomes more 
disappointment-averse, a smaller forward position will be held. This result is in 
line with the conclusion derived in the previous section, which introduced 
behavioral arguments into the traditional expected utility framework by defining 
different risk aversion parameters for asset and currency volatilities. 
4. 4. Conclusion 
 The purpose of this chapter was to incorporate behavioral issues as it 
relates to the active management of currency hedging of international portfolios in 
the context of traditional expected utility maximization as well as the axiomatic 
disappointment aversion frameworks. I have introduced separate risk aversion 
parameters for asset and currency markets, and due to the asymmetric nature of 
the compensation structure of currency managers, concluded that lower hedge 
ratios would arise, ceteris paribus. Alternatively, I evaluated the same problem in 
the disappointment averse utility function setting, and concluded that the more the 
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endowment fund manager gets disappointment averse, the less likely it is to have 
higher hedge ratios. 
 Whatever the style of problem solving might be, the right approach for 
designing currency overlay program including the choice of the appropriate 
benchmark, the combination of an effectively diversified group of managers as 
well as performance monitoring should entail the analysis of the effects of various 
outcomes on the fund’s asset liability structure given financial objectives and 
governance constraints. 
 As a further research inquiry I would a priori argue that the level of 
surplus, as defined by assets minus liabilities or excess return distribution, could 
be a significant determinant for the modeling of the active currency hedging issue. 
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